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ABSTRACT
Essays on International Economics and Macroeconomics
by
Sui-Jade Ho
Chair: Professor Andrei Levchenko
The first chapter presents a study on the employment effects of periodic policy
lapses and renewals. Economic theory postulates that uncertainty and temporary
disruptions in policies could lead to more permanent effects on the real economy
by reducing growth and investment. The sources of policy uncertainty are mani-
fold (Baker et al., 2014), in which political polarization is a potential explanation
in the rise in policy-related economic uncertainty in the U.S.. One way in which
political polarization could translate to greater policy uncertainty is the challenges
involved in passing policies that are subjected to periodic lapses and retroactive
renewal. This paper seeks to examine the cost of this type of policy shock on firm
employment outcomes. I utilized the periodic lapses and renewals of the Gener-
alized Systems of Preferences (GSP) in the 1990s to estimate the effects on firm
xi
employment. Depending on the amount of imports, firms with higher dependency
on the GSP regime experienced slower employment growth. The difference in the
employment growth rates between the GSP firms and controls persists for about
four years.
The second chapter discusses a key empirical challenge in measuring misallo-
cation and proposes a method to resolve the identification problem. The challenge
in the misallocation literature made popular by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) is the
identification of model parameters: a standard implementation cannot separately
identify the production function parameters from the measures of distortion. In
this paper, my co-author and I formally characterize two biases related to this lack
of identification: mismeasuring the labor output elasticity in a constant returns-
to-scale world, and assuming constant returns to scale when returns to scale in
production are not constant. In both cases, the econometrician’s error induces
spurious correlations between productivity and distortions, leading the econome-
trician to mismeasure misallocation. We first show how misallocation measures in
this class of models can be identified even when we cannot identify all the model
parameters. We then use U.S. Census Bureau microdata and document the magni-
tude of the two biases.
The third chapter measures the aggregate employment growth and realloca-
tion effects of multinational firms in the U.S. over the past decade and across the
manufacturing, retail, wholesale, and service sectors. At a fundamental level, un-
derstanding the contribution of multinational firms to U.S. employment growth
in contrast to non-multinational firms is the first-order issue. Are MNCs a major
xii
component of U.S. manufacturing employment decline? Did they grow faster rel-
ative to their domestic counterparts? Did they create and destroy more jobs at
new and existing establishments relative to controls? And, given that MNCs are
often vertically integrated and operate multiple lines of business, in what sectors
did they create and destroy jobs? My co-authors and I exploit a novel combination
of two micro datasets: the restricted-use U.S. Census Bureau establishment-level
microdata and the Bureau van Dyke Orbis firm database. The combined dataset
links firm and establishment-level activity to the scope and extent of a firm’s global
operations. We find that MNCs recorded higher total employment growth rates rel-
ative to the comparison group of non-MNCs. Furthermore, MNCs create more and
destroy fewer jobs than non-MNCs. Moreover, MNCs are found to have created
relatively more jobs across all sectors; notably in the services sector. This result
suggests that within-firm reallocation across sectors may be increasingly important
in the study of business dynamism.
xiii
CHAPTER I
The Employment Effects of Periodic Policy Lapses and
Renewals: Firm Level Evidence From The Generalized
Systems of Preferences1
1.1 Introduction
Economic theory postulates that uncertainty and temporary disruptions in poli-
cies could lead to more permanent effects on the real economy by reducing growth
and investment. If firms are uncertain of the timing and duration of a policy (e.g. a
tax credit), then they would be more likely to adopt a wait-and-see posture before
investing. As such, aggregate output growth would be slower than it would have
been in the case without policy uncertainty.
The sources of policy uncertainty are manifold. Baker et al. (2014) highlight the
role of the rise in political polarization in worsening policy uncertainty in the U.S.
1DISCLAIMER: "Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and
do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Census Bureau. All results have been reviewed to
ensure that no confidential information is disclosed."
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over time. With the increase in political polarization comes the greater challenges
involved in passing policies that are subjected to periodic lapses and retroactive
renewals2.
These periodic lapses and reinstatements in policy-making are an important
area of concern because policies that are aimed to increase employment and in-
vestment could inadvertently have the opposite effects. For instance, many gov-
ernment credits and deductions are intended to incentivize outcomes such as in-
vestments in green energy or R&D activities. But such investments typically involve
planning over the medium term and may even require substantial changes in the
way in which firms operate. If the incentives are unpredictable and could poten-
tially be abruptly revoked or suspended, then it is likely for firms to not undertake
such investments in the first place. For firms that did undertake these investments,
sufficiently large and protracted periods of uncertainties surrounding the relevant
policy incentives could cause these firms to scale back and make divestments.
Despite conjectures that these policy uncertainty effects could be large, it is
difficult to measure the micro effects on firm-level outcomes. In particular, most
shocks are either aggregate in nature (e.g. government shut down) or affect all
firms within an industry in the same way (e.g. wind tax credits). Therefore, it is
difficult to separately identify the effects of policy lapses from the effects of other
macro shocks.
In this vein, trade policy provides a particularly useful setting for us to exam-
2Some of these credits and deductions are known as “extenders” and are not a permanent part
of the tax code. These must be periodically renewed by Congress. In December 2015, the House of
Representatives passed the PATH Act which, among others, made nineteen (a third of the total) of
the temporary tax provisions permanent parts of the tax code.
2
ine the impact of policy lapses and reinstatements. Given the broad and general
nature of trade policies, the lessons that are drawn from this study are easily appli-
cable in other contexts. First, trade transaction data contains firm-level variations
across products, countries and time. Second, importers and exporters make sunk
investment in import/export markets and buyer-seller relationships, as well as in-
cur fixed costs in trade (Das et al. (2007), Halpern et al. (2015)). Third, there are
sequences of well-identified policy lapses and renewals that exist in one of the U.S.
trade policies; i.e. the U.S. Generalized Systems of Preferences (GSP).
Specifically, this paper seeks to examine the cost of this type of policy shock on
firm employment outcomes. To do so, I analyze the impact of firms that are affected
by the periodic lapses and renewals of the Generalized Systems of Preferences
(GSP)3 in the 1990s. The GSP regime is especially useful for this analysis as we
are able to utilize micro-level firm data to estimate the direct effects of the policy
shock.
The GSP program is a non-reciprocal trade arrangement extended by many
developed countries to developing countries. Countries such as the U.S., Japan and
the E.U. have similar versions of this policy in place, aimed at helping developing
countries to trade internationally4. While the details of this policy differ for each
country, the common essence is that imports from eligible trading partners are
charged a lower (or zero) tariff rate relative to the prevailing Most Favored Nations
(MFN) rate.
Since its inception, the U.S. GSP program has been reviewed periodically by
3The GSP is not part of the tax “extenders”.
4A current review of the GSP program is provided by Jones (2015).
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Congress. Throughout the 1990s, there were numerous instances in which the
program was allowed to lapse; that is, Congress did not renew the program before
its expiration date. When Congress eventually renewed the program, the program
was extended retroactively from the date of its previous expiration. That meant
that all duties that were paid during the lapsed period were subsequently refunded
to importers. Nevertheless, at the point when the program lapsed, it was uncertain
if the program would ever be reinstated. Moreover, the duration of the lapsed
period meant that the higher amount of tariff duties paid would have important
implications on the cash flow and inventory management of importers.
These periods of lapses and reinstatements provide discrete time notches of
changes in tariffs that were applied in trade transactions. The removal of prefer-
ence rate altered the costs of imports and if not reinstated, would directly affect
firms’ profits. Even if the GSP program was eventually reinstated, the impact on
firms’ cash flows and other firm choices, such as sourcing behavior, would likely be
affected.
This study seeks to identify the effects on firm employment due to policy un-
certainty, through this sequence of periodic lapses and reinstatements of the GSP
policy. The GSP policy affected a relatively small number of U.S. firms, and was un-
likely to change aggregate wages and prices. Therefore, using a partial equilibrium
approach, this study can effectively isolate the impact of the policy shocks.
Between 1993 and 2000, the GSP regime was allowed to expire and was sub-
sequently reinstated and extended retroactively six times (Table A.1). Although
most periods of expiration were relatively short (around four and a half months on
4
average), the disruption in July 1995 was longer and lasted for fourteen months.
It is therefore reasonable to assume that the renewal of the policy as well as the
timing of the renewal were both uncertain at the point of the lapse in the policy.
Furthermore, it is likely for firms that were less financially constrained to be bet-
ter equipped to weather the phase in which the policy lapsed. In this regard, I
find that there is some evidence that the firm’s financing condition could impact its
employment outcomes in light of the policy shock.
This paper relates to three strands of literature. First, it provides new empir-
ical evidence on the effects of policy uncertainty on firms’ choices and outcomes
(Dixit (1989), Bloom (2009), Bloom et al. (2007)) and more specifically, the ef-
fects of trade policy uncertainty (Handley (2014), Handley and Limão (2015),
Ruhl (2010)). Second, this paper is also related to the literature on trade and fi-
nancial constraints (Manova (2013), Manova et al. (2014), Feenstra et al. (2014)).
Third, there is also a growing body of research on the GSP program (Blanchard and
Hakobyan (2015), Hakobyan (2015), Hakobyan (2016)). It complements the re-
cent work by Hakobyan (2013) that finds the 2011 expiration of the GSP regime
led to the decline in the value of imports from GSP countries.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. I first present a simple concep-
tual framework that provides an expression for a firm’s labor demand function in
the presence of changes in policy uncertainties. Then, I describe the empirical ap-
proach and the results from my estimation exercise. Next, I conduct a counterfac-
tual exercise to estimate the aggregate effects of the policy lapses on employment.
Finally, I perform a series of robustness checks of the main results, including reesti-
5
mating the effects over a placebo time period, using an alternative measure of GSP
usage intensity and using an alternative specification to control for unobservables
at the firm level. The findings from these robustness checks are consistent with the
baseline results.
1.2 Background on the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences
The GSP program is a non-reciprocal trade arrangement extended by many
developed countries to developing countries. Countries such as the U.S., Japan and
the E.U. have versions of this policy in place, aimed at helping developing countries
to trade internationally. While the details of this policy differ for each country, the
common essence is that imports from eligible trading partners are charged a lower
(or zero) tariff rate relative to the prevailing Most Favored Nations (MFN) rate.
The U.S. program was established by Title V of the Trade Act of 1974. The
President has the discretion to determine both country eligibility and product cov-
erage under the GSP program5. In 2015, the United States Trade Representative
(USTR, 2016) reported the number of GSP beneficiary countries and territories
as 122, with the the total value of imports under the GSP program amounting to
17.4 billion USD (about 1 percent of total U.S. world imports). Some examples of
the top GSP products (by value) include motor vehicle parts, ferroalloys, building
stones, precious metal jewelry and electric motors and generators. The top GSP
beneficiary countries are India, Thailand, Brazil, Indonesia and the Philippines.
5The actual implementation of the system; and in particular, the practice of exclusion of coun-
tries and products has been found to be subjected to extensive executive discretion (Blanchard and
Hakobyan, 2015).
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There are explicit criteria that determine if a country is eligible to participate
in this program. These countries are designated as either beneficiary developing
countries (BDC) or least-developed beneficiary countries (LBDC). Over time, sev-
eral countries have graduated from the program either through the mandatory
graduation criteria (that is when the BDC is determined to be a high income coun-
try as defined by the World Bank) or at the discretion of the President.
The GSP program is also used by the U.S. as a trade measure to promote
worker rights. Over the years, several beneficiary countries have had their GSP
privileges suspended for reasons related to worker rights concerns (e.g. Liberia in
1990, Mauritania in 1993, the Maldives in 1993, Bangladesh in 2013). While such
suspensions could also contribute towards trade policy uncertainty, none of these
suspensions occurred during the period of the broader GSP policy disruption in
1995–1996 that will be studied in this paper.
In terms of product coverage, the formal principle that determines product eligi-
bility is given in the 1974 Trade Act. Of note, the GSP program excludes important
import sensitive products (e.g. textiles and apparels) as a way to protect U.S. man-
ufacturers and workers from import competition (Jones, 2015). Furthermore, the
program also imposes ceilings (i.e. Competitive Need Limitations, CNL) on GSP
imports for each product and beneficiary country. Upon breaching the ceilings,
the GSP benefits will not be applicable and the trade transaction may be subjected
to the MFN tariff rate, conditional on not passing other exception criteria. Given
that the value of GSP imports is relatively small and that the GSP products are
non-import sensitive, it is reasonable to consider the policy disruption in a par-
7
tial equilibrium framework and abstract from its impact on aggregate wages and
prices.
1.3 Conceptual Framework
The aim of this conceptual framework is to decompose the effects of a change
in input cost on the elasticity of labor demand into substitution effects from higher
import prices, scale effects from changes in output demand, and liquidity effects
from changes in working capital requirements. The conceptual framework will
combine elements of the model of incomplete exchange rates pass-through from
Amiti et al. (2014) and working capital constraints from Jermann and Quadrini
(2012). Under some mild assumptions, higher tariff levels on imports will be asso-
ciated with lower labor demand. Furthermore, with a working capital constraint to
capture the impact of liquidity constraints on the firm’s labor demand, the frame-
work will provide an additional margin in which the probability of tariff changes
would impact the firm’s labor demand through the liquidity constraint channel. I
will first describe the model without the working capital constraints, by highlight-
ing the interactions of the substitution and scale effects. Then, I will introduce
working capital constraints into the framework.
1.3.1 Demand
Following the tradition in the incomplete pass-through literature (Atkeson and
Burstein, 2008), households are assumed to have nested demand with constant-
8
elasticity of demand at two levels of demand; i.e. at the product and variety levels6.





where ρ is the price elasticity of demand of the variety and ν is the price elasticity















is the price index of the product.
As shown in previous studies, under Bertrand competition, the effective de-
mand elasticity is given as σi = ρ(1−Si)+νSi and we can express the multiplicative
markup asMi = σi/(σi − 1) 7.
1.3.2 Production
On the production side, the firm’s output is produced using a constant returns-
to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function with two inputs; i.e. labor Li and an
intermediate input bundle Xi. The intermediate input bundle Xi is a composite
of domestic intermediate varieties, Zij, and foreign intermediate varieties, Mijk,
6This demand system has previously been studied by Helpman and Krugman (1985) and others.











where j indexes the variety and k indexes the source country. Firms are price-
takers in the input markets. The price of labor, domestic and foreign intermediates
are w, Vj and Ujk, respectively. Foreign intermediates are also subjected to a import






























The full derivation of the model is in Appendix A.2. The expression for the firm’s
marginal cost is given as:
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1.3.3 Elasticity of Labor Demand
The goal of this section is to obtain an expression for the firm’s elasticity of
labor demand. From the first order condition for labor, the firm’s demand for labor
is given by:




from which, by taking the natural logarithms, the elasticity of labor demand with
respect to tariff costs can be derived. This consists of two components; i.e. the
substitution effects and scale effects. From theory, the substitution effects would
be positive because the relatively higher cost of intermediate inputs would lead to
the firm’s substituting away from intermediates towards labor. The scale effects
could, however, be negative, because the pass-through of higher input costs to
firm’s output price could lead to a reduction in the demand for the firm’s output.
∂ logLi
∂ log(1 + τjk)
=
∂ logMCi




∂ log(1 + τjk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Scale effects
(1.8)
Proposition 1. The expression for the substitution effects is given as:
∂ logMCi
∂ log(1 + τjk)






≥ 0 is the tariff incidence from foreign sellers to domestic
importers.
Proof in Appendix A.2.
Proposition 1 states that the substitution effects from an increase in the tariff
rate would be positive and would be higher, the greater the import intensity of
the firm for variety j from country k, and the greater the tariff incidence for that
variety. This result is straightforward and intuitive.
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Proposition 2. The expression for the scale effects is given as:
∂ log qi











Proof in Appendix A.2.
From Proposition 2, the sign of the scale effects from an increase in the tariff
rate would be negative.
Proposition 3. The expression for the total effects is given as:
∂ logLi


























< 0. For scale effects to
dominate substitution effects,
(
1− σik/(1 + Γik)
)
must be less than zero. That is,
σik > 1 + Γik. In other words, the elasticity of demand for firm i must be relatively
higher than the firm’s markup elasticity with respect to its price. 
Next, I extend this baseline framework to capture the effects of the probabilistic
changes in tariffs on a firm’s labor demand. Consider an infinitely-lived firm which
chooses new factor demands at each period with the goal of maximizing the net
present value of its flow profits. I assume that the firm chooses the level of employ-
ment and material at the beginning of each period that will be used in production
at the beginning at the next period. The effective tariff is assumed to be revealed
at the beginning of the next period. In other words, the firm chooses and pays for
its factors before the effective tariffs on the imported inputs are revealed.
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I also introduce working capital loan requirements in the presence of imperfect
contract enforcement. Firms are required to borrow an intra-period loan to cover
the cash-flow mismatch between the payments for inputs made at the beginning of
the period and the realization of revenue that takes place at the end of the period.
The intra-period loan is repaid at the end of the period. For simplicity, I assume
that there is no interest charged on this loan. The amount of working capital loan is
subjected to an enforcement constraint that depends on the firm’s expected equity
value, which in turn, depends on the firm’s expected future profitability. The effects
of expected changes in future tariffs would enter into the firm’s expected future
profitability in the form of higher expected input costs. The working capital loan
requirement, lt for firm i is given as8:






Ujkt(1 + τjkt)Mjktdj . (1.10)







Ujkt(1 + τjkt)Mjktdj = R(Lt, Xt) . (1.11)
Combining (1.10) with (1.11), I obtain the condition that the intra-period loan lt
must be equal to the firm’s revenue, R(Lt, Xt).
Next, I derive the lender’s enforcement constraint in an environment of imper-
fect contract enforcement. To prevent defaults, the amount of borrowing that the
8To simplify notation, the firm index i is omitted from this section onwards.
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lender will make available for to firm is limited and is obtained as follows. As-
sume that in the event of a default, the lender would obtain a fraction θ of the
(discounted) expected value of the firm’s equity. Let the value of the firm when it
defaults on its loan be VD and when it does not default, VN . I can write these terms
as follows:
VD = πt + lt + β(1− θ)EV ′
VN =πt + βEV
′
Therefore, the enforcement constraint to ensure a non-default equilibrium would
be to set VN ≥ VD.
lt ≤ βθEV ′ ≡ Θ (1.12)
The enforcement constraint could bind when EV ′ decreases or when θ decreases.
The latter is akin to a tightening of the enforcement constraint as discussed in
Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
To introduce the role of the possibility of higher tariffs in subsequent periods,
I follow the framework in Handley and Limão (2015) by assuming that there is a
probability γ that tariff will change and 1 − γ that tariff will remain unchanged
in each subsequent period. Let τ be the tariff rate of the current period and τ ′
be the tariff rate for the next period. The Bellman equation for the firm’s profit
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maximization problem is given as follows:
V (τ) = πt + β[(1− γ)V (τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
No tariff change
+ γEV (τ ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tariff change
] , (1.13)
where πt is the current period’s operating profits and the second term represents
the discounted expected future profits. With probability 1 − γ, tariff remains un-
changed in the next period, and the firm’s value in the next period remains at V (τ).
With probability γ, tariffs could change in the next period. In that event, the firm’s
value is given as EV (τ ′). I can express this last term as:
















The firm’s profit maximization problem is specified as follows:














































Ujkt(1 + τjkt)Mjktdj , and (1.20)
ptYt ≤ Θ . (1.21)
Let the Lagrange multipliers on the budget constraint be Λ0 and on the enforcement
constraint be Λ1. From the first order condition for labor, the optimal demand for
labor input is given as
L∗t = (1− φ)
M̃Ct ∗ Y ∗t
wt
[
1 + (Λ∗0 − Λ∗1)(1− β(1− γ))
1 + Λ∗0(1− β(1− γ))
]
= (1− φ)M̃Ct ∗ Yt
wt
Ξ


















Λ1 is the marginal value of the firm of borrowing. An additional dollar in bor-
rowing would be more valuable to the firm when the expected value of the firm
is low. Higher tariffs implies that expected value of the firm is lower. Therefore,
output (prices) will be lower (higher). Given a downward sloping demand curve,
marginal revenue will be higher.
Proposition 4. The total effects in the presence of the working capital constraint is
the sum of the substitution effects, scale effects and working capital effects.
d logLt
d log(1 + τjkt)
=
d log M̃Ct








d log(1 + τjkt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Working Capital Effects
(1.22)
The first and second terms are the substitution effects and scale effects as de-
scribed in the case without the working capital constraint. With the working capital
requirement and some probability that future tariff rate will change, I now have
a third term that I will call the working capital effects. This term will be non-
zero when Λ1 > 0, that is, when the enforcement constraint binds. From the
enforcement constraint condition, this would only bind if the probability of tariff
increasing is non-zero.
Suppose I start from a case whereby the enforcement constraint is not binding
and that there is no probability that future tariff rate will rise. If I shut down
the financial shock channel, such that θ is equal to one, then the enforcement
constraint would only bind when γ increases. In this setup, the total effects of a




Trade transaction data at the firm level for U.S. imports are obtained from the
Longitudinal Firm-Level Trade Transactions Data (LFTTD) maintained by the U.S.
Census Bureau. This dataset provides transaction level trade information at the
firm level for the universe of firms that engage in imports from 1992. As my base-
line sample, I first obtained the list of importers in the year 1995. I merged this
list of importers to the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) to obtain the firm’s
employment information9. Next, I merged this list of firms to the LBD for the years
1992 to 1994. For my baseline sample, I kept only the firms that are successfully
merged as they would have existed for all these years prior to 1995, to estimate the
pre-disruption employment trend. Then, I merged this list of firms over the years
from 1996 to 2000. In these later years, I would allow for the deaths of firms.
In addition to employment information, the LBD also provides information on the
industry, age and multi-unit status of firms. This information is used to generate
the covariates used in the fully saturated regression model as described in section
1.5.
The LFTTD dataset also contains information about the preference regime that
was applied on each trade transaction. From this information, I calculated the
value and share of a firm’s imports that entered through the GSP regime. In ad-
dition, I also merged additional relevant trade policy indicators such as the list of
countries and products that are eligible for GSP and the corresponding tariff rates.
9For a given year, the LBD is recorded at the firm-establishment level, while the LFTTD is
recorded at the firm level. The merge process is carried out by merging the two datasets using
the unique firm identifier that is constructed by the U.S. Census.
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This information is obtained from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS)
website.
The conceptual framework predicts that GSP firms that are more financially
constrained are the ones that will be disproportionately impacted by cost-shocks to
their input costs. Measures of financial constraints are calculated using firm data
from public-listed firms in COMPUSTAT for the years between 1980–2000, based
on the methodology pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Manova et al.
(2014). The first measure is the classic index for external finance dependence,
as proxied by the share of capital expenditures not financed from cash flow from
operations (CFO). The second measure is the availability of tangible assets to raise
external finance, which is proxied as the ratio of Net Property, Plant and Equipment
to Total Assets for each industry. The former measure captures the degree of impor-
tance of the initial outlay in firms’ financing investment activities, while the latter
captures the availability of collateral for firms to raise external finance. Both mea-
sures capture two distinct but complementary aspects of how financial constraints
could impact firms’ activities. To allow for these elements to operate in my estima-
tion, I construct a composite index of financial constraints for each industry, FC, by
taking the first principal component of these two measures.
1.5 Empirical Approach
The conceptual framework is mapped to the empirical estimation by assigning
a binary treatment indicator on firms that have utilized the GSP regime prior to
the period of the policy disruption. The primary identification strategy employed
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in this paper is based on the fully saturated regression model. The estimated re-
gression includes the fully interacted terms of the covariates, which in this case
would be observed firm characteristics (size, industry, age and multi-unit status).
This approach has been applied in several studies on firms’ employment dynam-
ics (Davis et al. (2014), Haltiwanger et al. (2012))10. As discussed in Angrist
and Pischke (2008), a saturated regression model fits the conditional expectation
function (CEF)11 perfectly and helps to avoid boundary issues related to bounded
dependent variables that arise in OLS estimation12. The latter point is especially
important given that the measure of employment changes that will be employed in
this paper is a bounded value, as will be described in the next section.
1.5.1 Baseline Regressions at the Firm Level
The baseline treatment group is defined as importing firms in which GSP im-
ports make up of at least 50 percent of their total imports in the period between
1994 and July 1995. Throughout the paper, this treatment group is referred to as
GSP firms. The baseline control group is defined as other importers not included
in the treatment group. As we shall see, the intensity of usage of the GSP regime
is an important factor that determines the firm’s employment outcomes. To verify
this point, other measures of usage intensity are calculated as robustness checks.
In addition to this binary indicator of treatment and control, as part of the robust-
10The advantages of using the fully saturated model are discussed in the web appendix of Halti-
wanger et al. (2012).
11The conditional expectation function is defined as E(y|X), with X being the list of covariates.
12Theorem 3.1.4 in Angrist and Pischke (2008) states that the CEF is linear when the population
regression yields the CEF. This occurs when either the joint normality assumption between y and
X holds, or when X is a fully saturated set of dummies.
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ness checks, I also calculated a continuous measure of the ratio of the firm’s GSP
imports relative to its total imports as another measure of the firm’s dependence
on the GSP regime.
Following Davis et al. (1996), the symmetric growth rate of employment y at




where xe,t = 0.5[ye,t + ye,t−k] .
This measure of symmetric growth rate is bounded between −2 and 2, and thus
is convenient as it can accommodate both entry and exit; unlike the case when
log differences are used. I aggregated the employment data up to the firm level
to provide for consistency in interpretation with the trade transaction information.
A fully saturated set of firm level fixed effects is constructed using the four way
interactions of firm size bins, age bins, industry and multi-unit status. Industry is
defined at the SIC 2 digit level. The categories for firm size are defined in terms
of the number of March 12 employment in the following discrete bins: 0–9, 10–
25, 26–50, 50–99, 100–249, 250–500, 501–999, 1000–2499, more than 2500.
Meanwhile, the categories for firm age is defined in the following bins: 0–2, 3–5,
6–8, 9–11, 12–14, 15–17, 18–20, 21 and above. The definition of a firm’s multi-
unit status is given in the LBD.
Firms’ decisions to import from GSP eligible countries may depend on several
factors, including pricing and the availability of alternatives. As long as these fac-
tors are orthogonal to firm-level outcomes, this is not a concern. But, if there are
omitted factors that drive both a firm’s usage of the GSP policy and the firm’s out-
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comes, then the results might be spurious. Therefore, I also included additional
controls such as proxy measures for the reliance of a firm on imported products
from the GSP regime, measures for quality (proxied by unit values), an indicator
for exporters and total value of imports.
The baseline cross-section regression specification is given as follows:
∆yit,t+k = β0 + β1GSP





where i indexes firms, t indexes years, ∆yit,t+k is the growth rate of employment
between year t and year t+ k, GSP i is a treatment variable (as defined above) for
a firm’s utilization of the GSP regime in the pre-treatment period, X′t are controls
(exporter status, log value of imports, proxy for reliance of top imported products
on GSP regime, proxy for quality and price (unit value indicators)) and νit is the
industry s × size z × age a × multi-unit m fixed effects. The variable of interest is
β1, which measures the differential impact on employment for an importer that is
affected by the GSP lapses and reinstatements.
Following the conceptual framework, I next examined the role of financial con-
straints on employment by estimating the following regression:
∆yit,t+k = β0 + β1GSP
i + β2GSP
i × FCs + X′tβ + νit + εit , (1.24)
where FCs is the financial constraint indicator. The framework implies that the





The medium-term impact of the GSP shock is estimated by considering a longer
time difference of growth rates in employment in the pre-GSP shock period with
the period after the large disruption. Following the methodology in Trefler (2004),


















The baseline specification is given by:
∆yipost −∆yipre = β0 + β1GSP i1995 + β2GSP × FC + X′tβ + νit + εit . (1.25)
An alternative specification that includes business conditions control, ∆bit, similar
to that described in Trefler (2004), was also estimated. Appendix A.3 provides
the details on the construction of the business conditions control. The rationale
for including the business conditions controls in the context of the GSP shocks is
the concern that the industries that are most affected by the GSP shocks could
also likely be similarly affected by other macroeconomics shocks. Therefore, I
included the measure of business conditions control and re-estimated the following
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regression:







In addition to estimating the intensive margin effects of the GSP shock, I next
consider how the GSP shock could impact the likelihood for a firm to die; i.e. the
extensive margin effects13. To examine this effect, I used the semi-parametric Cox
regression model (Cox, 1972) that is based on survival analysis. The model defines
the hazard rate for a firm to be a function of firm-specific factors. My baseline
model is given as follows:
hi(t|.) = h0(t) exp(α0 + α1GSPi + X
′
iαX + εt) ,
where hi(t|.) is the hazard rate or risk of failure of incumbent firm i at time t,
conditional on a set of regressors. This model consists of two components. First,
h0(t) is the unspecified baseline hazard function which depends only on t and not
on i. The second component consists of an expression for the covariates exp(α0 +
α1GSPi + X
′
iα + εt). The ratio of firm i’s hazard is proportional to another firm j’s
13Since I have restricted the sample of firms to consider the impact of the GSP shock on firms that







exp(α0 + α1GSPi + X
′
iαX + εt)
exp(α0 + α1GSPj + X
′
jαX + εt)





As shown in equation (1.27), this model can only identify relative hazard between
firms, and not the absolute hazard rate since h0(t) drops out. In this framework, α1
is the variable of interest. The remaining control variables are similar to the ones
used in the employment changes regressions. The coefficients α’s in the hazard
model are estimated using the maximum likelihood method.
To map the survival model more closely to the intuition of the theoretical frame-
work, I introduced an interaction term between the GSP indicator with the financial
constraint measure.
hi(t|.) = h0(t) exp(α0 + α1GSPi + α2FCi + α3GSPi × FCi + X
′
iαX + εt) (1.28)
1.5.2.3 Decomposition into Establishment Births, Acquisitions, Continuers,
Deaths and Divestitures
I further decomposed the effects of the GSP shock for each firm into its sepa-
rate components to understand the margin that has driven the changes in firms’
net job creation. As discussed in Haltiwanger et al. (2012), changes in gross job
creation and destruction could reveal interesting dynamics that could otherwise be
missed in simply looking at only net job creation. A detailed description of the
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methodology is provided in Appendix A.3.
A firm in the LBD could either be a single-unit firm or a multi-unit firm. For
multi-unit firms, their establishments can be defined as births, continuers, acquisi-
tions, divestitures and deaths. A birth is assigned when the establishment makes
its first appearance in the LBD, while a death is assigned when the establishment
ceases to exist in the year. Establishments that exist for two consecutive years are
deemed to be continuers. An existing establishment that switches ownership (FIR-
MID) is defined as an acquisition for the new firm and a divestiture for the old firm.









t+k − jddivestituret+k − jdcontinuert+k ,
(1.29)
where jcmt+k is the job creation rate at establishments of type m, with m ∈ (con-
tinuer, birth, acquisition), while jdmt+k is the job creation rate at establishments of
type m, with m ∈ (continuer, death, divestiture).
1.6 Results
The baseline results estimated based on equations (1.23) and (1.24) show that
GSP firms registered lower employment growth rates relative to controls in the
years after the large disruption in the GSP policy. Specifically, Table 1.2 shows the
employment changes for firms for the years 1996–2000, relative to the base year
of 1995. In the first year after the first major GSP policy shock, the growth rate of
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employment of a GSP firm is 3.33 percentage points lower than the control. The
difference in growth rates remains significant in the range of between 3.4 and 3.95
percentage points up until the year 1999.
Table 1.3 presents the results with both the level effects of the GSP shock and
the estimate of the interaction term between the GSP indicator and the measure of
financial constraint (FC). The results show that firms that are in industries that are
more financially constrained, and thus are likely to be more susceptible to binding
working capital constraints arising from the periods of lapses and reinstatements of
the policy regime, experienced significantly lower employment growth rates in the
first three years after the large policy disruption in 1995. The marginal impact of a
one percent increase in the measure of external finance dependence is a difference
in employment growth rate by about 2 to 4 percentage points in the three years
after the shock. The impact is estimated to last for three years as the difference
between the GSP firms and the control dissipated after that.
Using a longer time horizon in measuring growth rates, the difference in growth
rates in the post-shock period relative to the pre-shock period is shown in Table 1.4.
The results are found through a comparison between the three-year difference in
the growth rates of employment during the period before and after the policy shock
as estimated from equations (1.25) and (1.26). Columns (1) and (2) present the
results for (1.25), with the former showing the results without additional controls
and the latter with the additional controls. The signs of the coefficients are similar
in both regressions. Using column (2) as my preferred regression, the total annual-
ized employment growth rate for GSP firms with a one percent higher measure of
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financial constraint in the period after the policy disruption is about 4.1 percentage
points lower than non-GSP firms.
With the inclusion of the business conditions control, I find that both the sign
and the magnitude of the coefficients of interest (on the GSP indicator and on the
interaction of the GSP indicator with FC) are similar to that estimated in columns
(1) and (2). With column (4) as my preferred regression, I find that the marginal
effect of a one percent higher measure of financial constraint corresponds to a 1
percentage point lower employment growth rate.
Given that the magnitude of the differences in growth rates between GSP firms
and controls is quite large, one hypothesis could be that the difference is driven by
the death of firms. As such, the hazard models as described in equations (1.27)
and (1.28) are estimated. Table 1.5 reports the results of the proportional changes
for the hazard ratio, i.e. the odds ratio. Coefficients larger than one signify an in-
creased risk of failure, while values less than one signify decreased risk. Columns
(1) and (2) present the results from equation (1.27) and I find that the GSP firms
have between 6.3 and 7.1 percent higher hazard rate than non-GSP firms. Fur-
thermore, the coefficient on the interaction term between GSP and FC is negative
and significant, implying that financial constraints have been the additional margin
that contributed towards slower employment growth for GSP firms.
So far, the results show that the GSP firms have indeed experienced slower em-
ployment growth rates following the policy disruption. To understand the margin
that contributes towards this differences in growth rates, I decomposed the firm
level measure of net job flows as given by equation (1.29). Across the years after
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the policy disruption, the results presented in Figure 1.1 show that job destruc-
tion at continuing establishments provides the largest contributions towards the
differences in net job flows between GSP and non-GSP firms.
1.6.1 Counterfactual Exercise
The counterfactual exercise in this section seeks to estimate the effect of being
reliant on the GSP policy on employment in the sample. The main assumption for
this exercise is that it is partial equilibrium in nature, such that aggregate prices
and wages are held constant. As discussed in the introduction, this assumption is
appropriate in this study, since only a subset of importers are directly affected by
the GSP policy shocks.
The first step to calculate the counterfactual losses in employment due to the
GSP shock is to define T as the mapping from symmetric growth rates to the end-
period level, holding the initial level fixed (Chodorow-Reich, 2014).
∆yi,t−k,t =
T [∆yi,t−k,t]− yi,t−k
0.5[T [∆yi,t−k,t] + yi,t−k]




Let the counterfactual employment growth rate of a GSP firm i be given by:
∆ycfi,t−k,t = E[∆yi,t−k,t|GSP = 0]
and the fitted employment growth rate of firm i as:
∆ŷi,t−k,t = E[∆yi,t−k,t|GSP = 1] .
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Using the above mapping, let’s define the counterfactual period t employment
level for GSP firms as
ycfi,t = T [∆y
cf
i,t−k,t]
and the fitted value employment level as
ŷi,t = T [∆ŷi,t−k,t] .
The total sample employment losses due to the GSP shock would be
∑
i,GSPbase=1
[ycfi,t − ŷi,t] .
The proportion of net employment change in the sample of GSP firms due to the







Table 1.1: Counterfactual calculations of the effects of GSP on firms in the sample
1995–1998
Employment decline relative to 1995 −5.4%
Share of losses due to GSP 61%
Table 1.1 shows the results from this exercise. Total employment at GSP firms
in the sample declined by 5.4 percent in 1998 compared to 1995. Over the next
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three-year period after the shock, the counterfactual employment growth rate from
shutting down the GSP shock for this firm could mitigate about 60 percent of these
losses.
1.6.2 Robustness Checks
This section provides the results from various robustness checks. First, I con-
sider an alternative time period to investigate if the pattern of lower employment
growth rates experienced by GSP firms is simply a characteristic of this type of
firm or if, indeed, the GSP policy shock is an important feature that caused the
differences in growth rates. Second, I consider alternative measures of GSP usage
intensity. Firms that are more dependent on the GSP regime would likely be more
vulnerable to the policy shock. Third, I consider an alternative regression specifi-
cation by estimating a panel regression model with firm fixed effects. This spec-
ification estimates the within-firm changes in employment outcomes and absorbs
the (constant) unobserved firm-specific characteristics. This specification would,
to some degree, test the plausibility of the assumption of no selection on unobserv-
ables into utilization of the GSP regime that is made in the saturated regression
model.
1.6.2.1 Placebo time sample
The period of annual lapses and reinstatements of the GSP policy abated at the
end of 2001. After September 11, 2001, the U.S. Congress authorized a longer
period of renewal of five years, from end-2001 until 2006. Absent of such policy
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lapses and reinstatements, the impact of the GSP shocks on firms’ employment
should not be evident during this period. To verify this fact, I repeated the firm-
level analysis by estimating equations (1.23) and (1.24) on the sample for the
period 2002–2006.
The results from this placebo time sample are presented in Tables 1.7 and 1.8.
In both tables, the coefficient on the GSP indicator is shown to be not significantly
different from zero at the 5 percent level. Moreover, the coefficients on the inter-
action term between the GSP indicator and the financial constraint indicator are
positive and significant for all years during this period. The results from both ta-
bles support the hypothesis that the GSP firms are not shedding employment at
a higher pace relative to controls during the period in which the policy is more
stable.
1.6.2.2 Other measures of GSP usage intensity
I reestimated the baseline regressions using two different definitions of a GSP
firm. One would expect that the impact of the GSP policy shock be greater for
firms with higher intensity of usage. The first alternative defines the GSP firm as
one with 75 percent of its imports sourced using the regime. Table 1.9 and Table
1.10 present the results for this definition of a GSP firm. In Table 1.9, I find that
the growth rate of the GSP firm, measured this way, is 3.3 percentage points lower
relative to controls in 1996. For the next three years, the estimated growth rates
widened further and remained negative and significant at 5.4 percentage points
lower than controls in 1999. In Table 1.10, the coefficient on the GSP indicator
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follows a similar pattern as described in Table 1.9. The coefficient on the interac-
tion term between the GSP indicator and FC is negative and significant in 1997 and
1998. The magnitude of the marginal effects of the GSP policy shock for firms that
are more financially constrained is larger for GSP firms under this definition than
what was found in the baseline result.
The second measure defines the GSP firm as one with any percentage of its im-
ports being sourced using the regime. The results are presented in Table 1.11 and
Table 1.12. With this definition of a GSP firm, I find that the impact of the policy
shock is not significantly different to the growth rates of the controls. Putting these
results together, it suggests that there is a monotonic relationship between the de-
gree in which a firm utilizes the GSP regime and the effects on its employment
outcomes. A greater dependence on the GSP regime, measured as a percentage of
GSP imports, is associated with larger negative employment effects.
Similar outcomes are also obtained using the long difference of employment
changes as the dependent variable. In Table 1.13, Panel A and B show the results
with GSP at 75 percent and any intensity respectively. Comparing the preferred
specifications in columns (4) and (8), I find that GSP firms defined with a 75
percent intensity experienced a larger change in the decline in employment growth
rates (3 percentage points) after the policy disruption relative to controls. This
estimate is larger than the baseline estimate of 2.7 percentage points as shown in
Table 1.4. The marginal effect of a one percent increase in the measure of the
financial constraint index on GSP firms in the case of the 75 percent intensity is
broadly similar in magnitude with the baseline (1.11 percentage points compared
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to 1.07 percentages points). However, for the case in which the GSP firms are
defined to be firms that imported using the GSP regime, regardless of intensity of
use, the marginal effect of a one percent increase in the measure of the financial
constraint index is insignificant.
1.6.2.3 Controlling for Firm Fixed Effects
The baseline regression was estimated by comparing GSP firms with a set of
controls defined within particular cells (defined as the interaction of industry, age,
multi-unit status and size). Nonetheless, one way that these results could be con-
founded would be due to the prevalence of unobserved firm specific characteristics.
In this set of robustness checks, the regressions are specified with firm fixed effects
to absorb these firm-level characteristics. Since both the GSP and FC indicators
are not time-varying, the level coefficients on these indicators are not identified.
Therefore, to identify the marginal effects of the GSP shocks on firms’ employment
outcomes, the interaction term between GSP, FC and the time indicator, POST, is
examined. POST is a binary indicator; defined as unity for the years in which the
GSP policy was more disruptive (1996–1998) and 0, otherwise. Year fixed effects
are also included to control for any time trends in the growth rates in employment.
The dependent variable is the annual change in firm employment. I estimated the
following firm-level equation:
∆yit,t+1 = β0 + β1POSTt ×GSP i × FCi + β2POSTt ×GSP i+
β3POSTt × FCi + ηi + µt + εit , (1.30)
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where ηi is the firm fixed effect and µt is the year fixed effect. The coefficient of
interest is β1 in that it measures the marginal effects of the policy disruption on
GSP firms that are more financially constrained.
Column (1) in Table 1.6 shows the results for the whole sample. Overall, GSP
firms that are more financially constrained registered lower annual growth rates
in employment (the marginal effect from policy shock and financial constraint is
−2.3 percentage points) during the years after the policy disruption. One could
also be interested to examine the differences in effects for single-unit firms vis-à-
vis multi-unit firms. By comparing the regression coefficients in columns (2) and
(3), I find that the negative marginal employment growth effect is significant only
for single-unit firms (−2.7 percentage points). Meanwhile, the marginal effect of
the GSP shocks on multi-unit firms is not significant. This result provides some
suggestive evidence that single-unit firms (typically smaller) are more vulnerable
to policy disruptions.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I show that the effect of uncertain policy disruptions on firms’
employment outcomes is both significant and economically important. Using the
GSP policy disruption in 1995–1996 as an event study, firms that were affected
by the GSP policy disruption experienced between 3 to 4 percentage points lower
employment growth in the four years after the disruption.
These results provide evidence that support the popular conjecture that policy
uncertainty does indeed impact real economic activity negatively. One important
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policy implications from the results is that policy uncertainty arising from the lapses
and reinstatements of public policies could inadvertently lead to the opposite out-
come from the original intent of the policy. Policies that are intended to boost
employment or investment could, in practice, do just the opposite.
Although this paper does not explicitly study the utilization of the GSP regime,
some related studies (see Jones (2015)) have found that GSP utilization is low
and has declined over time14. Policy uncertainty of this regime could potentially
further reduce the utilization rate since it creates an additional cost for firms to
utilize the regime. This explanation suggests an additional channel in which policy
uncertainty could fail to achieve its intended outcome by raising the implicit fixed
cost of entry.
The findings of this paper suggest that the impact of policy uncertainties on
firm outcomes is likely to be quite important in most settings. Future work could
consider extensions towards understanding of policy uncertainties on other firm
choices (such as mark-ups, buyer-seller margins and sourcing patterns).
14Reasons that have been studied include insufficient preference margins given the fixed costs of
preference utilization, information asymmetry, lack of infrastructure, etc.
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Table 1.2: Growth Rates of Firm’s Employment Relative to 1995
Growth Rates of Firm’s Employment Relative to 1995
1993 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
GSP (50 percent) −0.0257*** −0.0041 −0.0333** −0.0192 −0.0395** −0.0341* −0.0289
[0.0098] [0.00822] [0.0143] [0.0170] [0.0190] [0.0195] [0.0216]
R-squared 0.145 0.105 0.08 0.072 0.074 0.075 0.076
No of Firms 76000 76000 76000 76000 76000 76000 76000
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
a Fixed Effects (FE) are the interactions of Age X Size X Multi-Unit X Industry.
b Standard errors are clustered at the Age X Size X Multi-Unit X Industry level.
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Table 1.3: Growth Rates of Firm’s Employment Relative to 1995 (With Financial Constraint Index)
Growth Rate of Firm’s Employment Relative to 1995
1993 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
GSP (50 percent) −0.0257*** −0.0041 −0.0332** −0.0190 −0.0394** −0.0340* −0.0288
[0.00983] [0.00820] [0.0141] [0.0168] [0.0190] [0.0194] [0.0216]
GSP × FC −0.0043 0.0016 −0.0206* −0.0401** −0.0343* −0.0237 −0.0079
[0.00980] [0.00760] [0.0121] [0.0160] [0.0187] [0.0181] [0.0195]
R-squared 0.145 0.105 0.08 0.072 0.074 0.075 0.076
No of Firms 76000 76000 76000 76000 76000 76000 76000
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
a Fixed Effects (FE) are the interactions of Age X Size X Multi-Unit X Industry.
b Standard errors are clustered at the Age X Size X Multi-Unit X Industry level.
c FC is the measure of external finance dependence calculated using the principal component method.
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Table 1.4: Long Difference in Growth Rates of Employment
Long Difference in Growth Rates of Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GSP (50 percent) −0.0103 −0.0272*** −0.0092 −0.0270***
[0.007] [0.0075] [0.007] [0.007]
GSP × FC −0.0152* −0.0145* −0.0108* −0.0107*
[0.009] [0.009] [0.006] [0.0056]
∆bipost −∆bipre 0.644*** 0.211
[0.185] [0.193]
Observations 76000 76000 76000 76000
R-squared 0.146 0.151 0.093 0.099
Other Controls No Yes No Yes
Clustered S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
a Fixed Effects (FE) for Columns (1) and (2) are the interaction term of Age X Size X
Multi-Unit Status. For Columns (3) and (4), the fixed effects are Age X Size X Multi-Unit
X Industry.
b Standard errors are clustered at the Age X Size X Multi-Unit X Industry level.
c FC is the measure of external finance dependence calculated using the principal com-
ponent method.
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Table 1.5: Proportional Cox Model
Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GSP (50 percent) 1.063* 1.071** 1.062* 1.071**
[0.0344] [0.0375] [0.0338] [0.0370]
FC 0.9910 0.9330
[0.0151] [0.0531]
GSP × FC 1.067* 1.060*
[0.0413] [0.0373]
Observations 76000 76000 76000 76000
Sample All Importers All Importers All Importers All Importers
Other Controls No Yes No Yes
a FC is the measure of external finance dependence calculated using the principal component
method.
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Table 1.6: Annual Growth Rates of Employment with Firm Fixed Effects
Annual growth rates of employment
All Importers Single-Unit Multi-Unit
(1) (2) (3)
GSP (50 percent) × FC × POST −0.0229*** −0.0266*** −0.0182
[0.00816] [0.00879] [0.0217]
GSP (50 percent) × POST −0.0182* −0.0236** 0.0236
[0.00958] [0.0107] [0.0213]
FC × POST 0.00522*** 0.00871*** 0.0027
[0.00196] [0.0029] [0.0024]
No of Firms 76000 59000 18000
R-squared 0.231 0.226 0.262
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes
a POST is an indicator variable (1 for years 1996, 1997, 1998; and 0 for years 1993, 1994,
1995).
b Standard errors are clustered at firm level.
c FC is the measure of external finance dependence calculated using the principal component
method.
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Table 1.7: Alternative Time Period
Growth Rates of Firm’s Employment Relative to 2002
2001 2003 2004 2005 2006
GSP (50 percent) −0.0155 −0.0243* −0.023 −0.0283 −0.0177
[0.00988] [0.0131] [0.0179] [0.0188] [0.0205]
R-squared 0.097 0.051 0.058 0.064 0.071
No of Firms 98000 98000 98000 98000 98000
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
a Fixed Effects (FE) are the interactions of Age X Size X Multi-Unit X Industry.
b Standard errors are clustered at the Age X Size X Multi-Unit X Industry level.
Table 1.8: Alternative Time Period (With Financial Constraint Index)
Growth Rates of Firm’s Employment Relative to 2002
2001 2003 2004 2005 2006
GSP (50 percent) −0.0163 −0.0256* −0.0245 −0.0306 −0.0201
[0.00991] [0.0132] [0.0179] [0.0189] [0.0205]
GSP × FC 0.0176* 0.0275** 0.0315** 0.0488*** 0.0517***
[0.00942] [0.0123] [0.0153] [0.0183] [0.0198]
R-squared 0.097 0.051 0.058 0.064 0.071
No of Firms 98000 98000 98000 98000 98000
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
a Fixed Effects (FE) are the interactions of Age X Size X Multi-Unit X Industry.
b Standard errors are clustered at the Age X Size X Multi-Unit X Industry level.
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Figure 1.1: Decomposition of the Contribution of Net Job Flows into Components
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Table 1.9: Alternative Measures of Intensity of GSP Usage - 75 percent
Growth Rates of Firm’s Employment Relative to 1995
1993 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
GSP (75 percent) −0.0169 −0.0040 −0.0331** −0.0427** −0.0654*** −0.0543*** -0.0360
[0.0114] [0.00916] [0.0149] [0.0191] [0.0207] [0.0205] [0.0234]
R-squared 0.145 0.105 0.08 0.072 0.074 0.075 0.076
No of Firms 76000 76000 76000 76000 76000 76000 76000
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
a Fixed Effects (FE) are the interactions of Age X Size X Multi-Unit X Industry.
b Standard errors are clustered at the Age X Size X Multi-Unit X Industry level.45
Table 1.10: Alternative Measures of Intensity of GSP Usage - 75 percent (with Financial Constraint Index)
Growth Rate of Employment Between Year and 1995 (DHS)
1993 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
GSP (75 percent) −0.0168 −0.0040 −0.0328** −0.0417** −0.0643*** −0.0535*** −0.0354
[0.0114] [0.009] [0.0148] [0.0189] [0.0205] [0.0203] [0.0233]
GSP × FC −0.0039 0.0003 −0.0123 −0.0410** −0.0423** −0.0303 −0.0226
[0.0102] [0.008] [0.0121] [0.0178] [0.0204] [0.0197] [0.0216]
R-squared 0.145 0.105 0.08 0.072 0.074 0.075 0.076
No of Firms 76000 76000 76000 76000 76000 76000 76000
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
a Fixed Effects (FE) are the interactions of Age X Size X Multi-Unit X Industry.
b Standard errors are clustered at the Age X Size X Multi-Unit X Industry level.
c FC is the measure of external finance dependence calculated using the principal component method.
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Table 1.11: Alternative Measures of Intensity of GSP Usage - Any Percent
Growth Rates of Firm’s Employment Relative to 1995
1993 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
GSP (Any percent) −0.0545*** −0.0604*** −0.0253 −0.0078 −0.0023 0.0001 0.0144
[0.0161] [0.0138] [0.0164] [0.0204] [0.0246] [0.0263] [0.0271]
R-squared 0.145 0.105 0.08 0.072 0.074 0.075 0.076
No of Firms 76000 76000 76000 76000 76000 76000 76000
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
a Fixed Effects (FE) are the interactions of Age X Size X Multi-Unit X Industry.
b Standard errors are clustered at the Age X Size X Multi-Unit X Industry level.47
Table 1.12: Alternative Measures of Intensity of GSP Usage - Any Percent (with Financial Constraint Index)
Growth Rate of Employment Between Year and 1995 (DHS)
1993 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
GSP (Any percent) −0.0545*** −0.0604*** −0.0252 −0.0078 −0.0023 0.0001 0.0144
[0.0161] [0.0138] [0.0164] [0.0204] [0.0246] [0.0263] [0.0271]
GSP × FC −0.0002 0.0011 −0.0027 −0.0048 −0.0034 0.0007 0.0037
[0.00586] [0.00397] [0.00543] [0.00825] [0.0132] [0.0120] [0.0113]
R-squared 0.145 0.105 0.08 0.072 0.074 0.075 0.076
No of Firms 76000 76000 76000 76000 76000 76000 76000
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
a Fixed Effects (FE) are the interactions of Age X Size X Multi-Unit X Industry.
b Standard errors are clustered at the Age X Size X Multi-Unit X Industry level.
c FC is the measure of external finance dependence calculated using the principal component method.
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Table 1.13: Long Difference in Growth Rates of Employment (Other Measures of
GSP Usage Intensity)
Long Difference in Growth Rates of Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Indicator Variable is GSP user (75 percent)
GSP (75 percent) −0.0181** −0.0326*** −0.0147* −0.0303***
[0.0082] [0.0086] [0.00800] [0.0086]
GSP × FC −0.0158* −0.0164* −0.0107* −0.0111*
[0.0092] [0.009] [0.00575] [0.0057]
∆bipost −∆bipre 0.643*** 0.21
[0.185] [0.193]
Observations 76000 76000 76000 76000
R-squared 0.146 0.151 0.093 0.099
Other Controls No Yes No Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Long Difference in Growth Rates of Employment
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel B: Indicator Variable is GSP user (any)
GSP (Any percent) 0.0107*** −0.0234** 0.00752** −0.0252**
[0.0037] [0.00996] [0.0037] [0.0099]
GSP × FC −0.004 −0.003 −0.002 -0.002
[0.0046] [0.0042] [0.0029] [0.0028]
∆bipost −∆bipre 0.649*** 0.213
[0.186] [0.193]
Observations 76000 76000 76000 76000
R-squared 0.146 0.151 0.093 0.099
Other Controls No Yes No Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
a Fixed Effects (FE) for Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) are the interaction term of Age X Size
X Multi-Unit Status. For Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) the fixed effects are Age X Size X
Multi-Unit X Industry.
b Standard errors are clustered at the Age X Size X Multi-Unit X Industry level.




Measuring Misallocation in U.S. Manufacturing (with
Dimitrije Ruzic)1
2.1 Introduction
Misallocation can only be measured against a clearly specified alternative: how
would resources be allocated in the absence of distortions? Building on the ideas
of Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009), a large literature
infers misallocation as the improvement in aggregate productivity from equalizing
marginal revenue products across establishments. We highlight a key identification
issue in this literature: a standard implementation cannot separately identify the
production function parameters and the distortions faced by establishments. This
lack of identification can induce spurious correlations between productivity and
distortions, leading the econometrician to mismeasure misallocation. We first show
1DISCLAIMER: "Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and
do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Census Bureau. All results have been reviewed to
ensure that no confidential information is disclosed."
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how misallocation measures in this class of models can be identified even when
we cannot identify all the model parameters. We then formally derive the biases
associated with mismeasuring production-function parameters and quantify them
using U.S. Census microdata.
To illustrate the close link between production-function parameters and mea-
sures of misallocation, we turn to a standard example used in this literature. Con-
sider two equally-productive establishments. If one establishment faces barriers
to acquiring capital, it uses less capital and has a higher marginal product of cap-
ital. If we could reallocate inputs across the two establishments so as to equal-
ize their marginal products, this economy would produce more output and have
higher measured productivity. In this example both establishments are equally
productive; productivity and distortions are uncorrelated. We emphasize that mis-
measuring production-function parameters induces spurious correlations between
productivity and distortions where none may exist.
Consider a setting in which Cobb-Douglas production technology combines cap-
ital and labor. If the econometrician overstates the output elasticity of labor, she
perceives as more productive the establishments that employ relatively more cap-
ital than labor. Returning to the earlier example, the establishment with the cap-
ital distortion uses less capital and its inferred productivity would be lower. Con-
versely, by overstating the output elasticity of capital, the econometrician perceives
as more productive the establishments that employ relatively less capital than la-
bor. In the example, the establishment facing the distortion now has a higher
inferred productivity than its counterpart. In both cases, mismeasurement of the
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production-function elasticities induces spurious correlations between productivity
and distortions.
These spurious correlations are impediments to measuring misallocation cor-
rectly. In a hypothetical exercise where distortions are equalized across estab-
lishments, there are two reasons the econometrician might expect aggregate pro-
ductivity to improve. First, equalizing distortions across equally-productive estab-
lishments reallocates inputs in a manner that equalizes marginal products. This
re-allocation transfers inputs from where the marginal products are low to where
they are high, and, in the process, increases output. Second, if the most productive
firms face the largest distortions, then this counterfactual would disproportionaly
unburden the most productive firms and lead to even larger aggregate productiv-
ity gains. If there is no correlation between productivity and distortion, as in the
example above, then this second channel is muted. If the econometrician induces
a spurious positive correlation between the two, then the second channel is opera-
tional. However, the aggregate productivity improvement from the second channel
is fictitious: true productivity is uncorrelated with distortions and this increase
in aggregate productivity cannot be realized. In this manner, the econometrician
could overstate misallocation.
We emphasize these particular biases because production-function parameters
in models of misallocation are generally not identified. For instance, in the orig-
inal Hsieh and Klenow (2009) implementation, the authors use three observa-
tions for each establishment in an industry: value added, expenditures on labor,
and perpetual-inventory measures of the capital stock. To measure misallocation,
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the authors then back out three parameters for each establishment: a measure
of TFP, and two distortions, one for each first-order condition. In addition to
these establishment-level parameters, the measurement of misallocation requires a
production-function parameter that is common to all establishments in the indus-
try: an output elasticity of labor in a constant-returns-to-scale production function.
If there are N establishments in an industry, there are 3N data points with which
to identify 3N + 1 parameters. Indeed, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) state that they
“cannot separately identify the average capital distortion and the. . . production
elasticity in each industry.” If this lack of identification leads to incorrectly esti-
mated production-function parameters, then the econometrician will mismeasure
establishment-level productivity and aggregate misallocation.
We resolve this identification problem in two steps. First, we show that the mea-
sure of misallocation requires knowledge of relative distortions within an industry.
In the process, we eliminate the level of the average distortions from the parameter
space for measuring misallocation. Second, we highlight the fact that the model is
agnostic about the mapping of the distortions to the data; these distorts are wedges
in establishment first-order conditions. There are multiple model-consistent ways
of specifying where in the establishment profit function the distortions are located.
Given the data available in the U.S. Census of Manufactures, we cannot identify
production function parameters with a commonly-used profit function where dis-
tortions fall on firm size and the capital-labor ratio. However, we can identify the
production function parameters with a profit function where the distortions fall
directly on the labor and capital input choices. Together, these two steps allow us
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to measure misallocation in a model-consistent manner.
Our emphasis on production-function-driven biases is also a means of bridging
the literatures on misallocation and on returns to scale (RTS). The large litera-
ture building on the work of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) tends to assume constant-
returns-to-scale production technologies with labor elasticities that vary across in-
dustries. A separate literature, including Hall (1990), Basu and Fernald (1997),
and Basu et al. (2006), has suggested that the returns to scale in production plau-
sibly differ across industries. Consequently, incorrectly imposing constant RTS can
lead to the types of biases we detail in this paper.
Figure 2.1 presents two cases of mismeasurement for U.S. manufacturing mis-
allocation. In each panel, the vertical axis measures the increase over U.S. manu-
facturing TFP from equalizing distortions across establishments in an industry. The
horizontal axis is time in years. In both panels, the solid blue line plots measured
misallocation for the identified constant returns-to-scale model. For this model,
production-function parameters vary by industry. In panel A, we compare this
identified model to one where we instead identify a single, constant RTS produc-
tion function across all industries (dashed red line). In this comparison, misal-
location in U.S. manufacturing is overstated by 10–25%, depending on the year.
Underlying this positive aggregate bias is a collection of industries, some of which
see their labor output elasticities overstated and some see it understated. In sec-
tion 2.3 we derive the expressions showing that the direction of the industry-level
bias depends on the direction in which the labor elasticity is mismeasured, as well
as the underlying correlation of productivity and capital-labor ratios in the indus-
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try. In section 2.6 we corroborate these predictions at the industry level and then
show how the different industry biases aggregate to produce the aggregate bias.
In panel B, we compare the identified constant RTS model to one in which we
allow returns to scale in production to be variable. Our currently disclosed mea-
sures suggest that most industries face decreasing returns to scale in production
at the establishment level. Consistent with the bias expressions we derive, over-
stating RTS by assuming RTS are constant leads to an overstatement of measured
misallocation. The green dashed line in panel B reflects the smaller estimates of
manufacturing misallocation when returns to scale are allowed to vary.2
We see this paper contributing most directly to the misallocation literature
by identifying the parameters for measuring misallocation in this commonly-used
framework. Beyond these direct contributions, we hope that our characteriza-
tion of production-function-driven biases highlights the importance of identifying
model-consistent production functions. In a variety of economic settings, an al-
ternative characterization of the world might require reestimation of production
functions. Consider, for instance, models in which firms pay fixed costs in terms of
labor, perhaps to access a market. Faced with data on value added and labor ex-
penditures, the econometrician might be tempted to infer a labor output elasticity
as the ratio of labor expenditures to value added. However, if firms pay fixed
2Our currently disclosed estimates of RTS comprise the same identified labor elasticity as in the
constant RTS model and a capital elasticity that is estimated using OLS. We think the current esti-
mates likely overstate the extent of decreasing returns to scale and hence overstate the measure-
ment bias from allowing for non-constant returns to scale. We are working on a model-consistent
way to estimate the capital elasticity accounting for unobserved productivity differences across es-
tablishments using a dynamic panel procedure detailed later in the paper. We plan to update these
results in a subsequent disclosure and update to this working paper.
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B: Variable Returns to Scale Bias
Note: The U.S. Manufacturing time series here is constructed using the Annual Survey of Manufac-
tures, which is described in greater detail in the Data section of the paper and the accompanying
data appendix.
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costs in units of labor, then only a subset of the labor expenditures speak to la-
bor used in production. An econometrician using the entirety of the reported labor
expenditures would overstate the labor output elasticity. The resulting bias in mea-
sured productivity follows the bias patterns we characterize here.
To make these points more transparent, in section 2.2 we present a model of
misallocation within a closed-economy multi-industry setting with establishment
heterogeneity à la Melitz (2003). We allow returns to scale in production to vary
across industries and incorporate distortions to inputs in the style of Hsieh and
Klenow (2009). Section 2.3 formalizes two types of biases that might arise in this
type of model: mismeasurement of labor elasticities in a constant RTS world, and
mismeasurement of capital elasticities in a variable RTS world. In section 2.4 we
introduce U.S. Census microdata, and throughout section 2.5 we discuss identifi-
cation and the mapping of the model to data. Sections 2.6 and 2.7 present the
empirical evidence on the size and direction of the biases, as well as time series
measures of U.S. manufacturing misallocation. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Model and Economic Intuition
We assume that the manufacturing sector is characterized by a representative
establishment selling its output Y in a perfectly competitive market. This firm
aggregates the output Yi of I different industries using a Cobb-Douglas production
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Y θii , with
I∑
i=1
θi = 1 . (2.1)
Cost minimization by this aggregating firm implies that θi is also each industry’s
share of aggregate expenditure
PiYi = θiPY , (2.2)










An industry aggregating firm produces Yi from the output of Ni differentiated es-









Each establishment in the industry produces value-added output Yie by combining







where the industry level returns to scale βi are the sum of the output elasticities
αKi and αLi. Each establishment maximizes profits by taking as given the prices
R and w from perfectly-competitive input markets. However, the effective cost of
an input varies across establishments, with the τKie and τLie capturing this input-
specific distortions for capital and labor, respectively.
πie = PieYie − (1 + τLie)wLie − (1 + τKie)RKie (2.6)
By internalizing the demand for its variety, the establishment charges a price
that is a constant markup over its marginal cost. Note that the marginal cost under












× (1 + τKie)






Within the confines of this model, there is a natural restriction on the returns
to scale parameter. As in Basu and Fernald (1997), standard cost-minimization re-
quires that the RTS parameter βi be (weakly) less than the markup σ/(σ − 1). The
returns to scale and the markup shape the price elasticities of supply and demand,
respectively. The price elasticity of supply is increasing in the RTS parameter βi:
when RTS are sufficiently large, the supply curve becomes downward sloping. The
restriction that βi is smaller than the markup guarantees that a downward-sloping
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supply curve is not steeper than a downward-sloping demand curve. This restric-
tion ensures that the willingness-to-pay reflected in the demand curve exceeds the
cost of production embodied by the supply curve when establishments are decid-
ing whether to produce. A rearrangement of this inequality guarantees that the
often-recurring term [βi + σ(1− βi)] is positive.

















Moreover, measured either in terms of physical output or the establishment’s















(1 + τKie′ )
αKi (1 + τLie′ )
αLi
](σ−1)/(βi+σ(1−βi)) (2.10)
These distortions affect establishment choices by changing the marginal rev-
enue gained from an additional unit of an input (e.g. MRPKie for capital Kie).
In equilibrium, the marginal revenue product of an additional hired input equals
the effective cost to the establishment of hiring the input. If an establishment faces
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barriers that make acquiring capital more expensive, then (1+τKie) is high, and the
establishment will only hire an additional unit of capital if its MRPKie exceeds the
cost (1 + τKie)R. The same reasoning holds for all variable inputs in production.









= (1 + τKie)R (2.11)









= (1 + τLie)w (2.12)
To understand the impact of establishment-level distortions on the productivity of
the industry as a whole, we need to aggregate the establishment choices. Com-
bining input-market-clearing conditions with establishment input choices, we can
show that each industry uses capital and labor in proportion to the industry’s share
of the national economy θi, the industry’s input elasticity αXi for a given factor X,
and in inverse proportion to that factor’s average marginal revenue products across





















The average marginal revenue products are weighted by establishment size.
In the absence of distortions, or if all establishments faced the same distortion,
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MRPXie would be equal across establishments and hence equal to the industry
MRPXi. We revisit this point below when we define a counterfactual allocation of













































where Ai is the total factor productivity TFPi of the industry. In thinking about
how distortions affect industry productivity, we introduce notation based on Foster
et al. (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) that distinguishes the productivity
for producing a quantity of physical goods, TFPQie, from the productivity for
generating revenue, TFPRie.
















This distinction is helpful since two establishments with the same physical pro-
























Revenue productivity increases with the level of distortions, as the establish-
ment’s input bundle has to compensate for a large effective cost of hiring the in-
puts. Under decreasing returns to scale, higher physical productivity raises revenue
productivity; under increasing returns to scale, higher physical productivity lowers
revenue productivity. This differential impact of RTS on TFPRie comes from the
relationship between the RTS parameter, βi, and the price elasticity of supply. With
higher returns to scale come higher price elasticities. For a small increase in phys-
ical productivity, price declines much more strongly under increasing returns to
scale. The decline in equilibrium price can sufficiently offset the increase in output
from higher Aie so that the average revenue productivity TFPRie declines under
increasing RTS.
We can define an industry revenue productivity following the establishment
definition:













This formulation of industry revenue productivity allows us to write industry TFPi
as CES aggregate of establishment physical productivity Aie, weighted by the differ-
63















The weight captures the establishment’s size, as well as the deviations of its marginal

























More distorted establishments have smaller weights. Consequently, the correla-
tion of productivity and distortion is important for measuring gains from equalizing
the distortions faced by different establishments within the industry. If more pro-
ductive establishments are also more distorted, then equalizing distortions would
give larger weights to the more productive establishments in the counterfactual.
This tilting of weights toward more productive establishments would translate to
large TFP gains from reallocating inputs.
More formally, if all establishments within an industry face the same distor-
tions, so that τ = τ , then the establishment weights for calculating industry TFPi
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Note that under constant returns to scale βi = 1 and TFPRie is identical across
all establishments. This equality is at the center of the intuition used in Hsieh
and Klenow (2009)intuition: “A key result we exploit is that revenue productiv-
ity. . . should be equated across firms in the absence of distortions. To the extent
revenue productivity differs across firms, we can use it to recover a measure of
firm-level distortions.” Note, however, that if returns to scale in an industry are not
constant, then revenue productivity can vary across undistorted establishments. As
a result, there is not a direct mapping between the variance of TFPR and the mis-
allocation within industry. To calculate the gains from eliminating distortions, the
econometrician has to calculate the counterfactual weight from equation (2.25) for
each establishment.
For every industry i, we then define misallocation as Φi, the net gain to industry























− 1 . (2.26)
65





where θi is industry i’s revenue share in the manufacturing sector.
2.3 Measurement Biases
Before moving to the data, we first formalize two biases that can arise with
mismeasurement of production functions. First, we consider the case where an
econometrician in a constant RTS world mismeasures the labor elasticity αLi for a
given industry. Second, we consider the case where an econometrician in a variable
RTS world looks at the data through the lens of constant returns and incorrectly
uses 1− αLi for the capital elasticity αKi.
2.3.1 Mismeasured Labor Elasticity Under Constant Returns to Scale




ie , a constant RTS version of the production function
in equation (2.5), what if the econometrician incorrectly estimates α̂Li = γiαLi?
When γi > 1, then the labor share in this industry is overstated, and the capital
share 1− α̂Li is understated. The distortions would then be estimated as:
( ̂1 + τLie) = γi(1 + τLie)





Note that each distortion is mismeasured by a proportional, industry-specific con-
stant. Hence, despite mismeasuring the level of the distortion, the econometrician
can correctly calculate the distortion relative to an industry average. More specifi-







However, using the incorrect production function, the econometrician would in-












In short, if she overstates αLi so that γi > 1, then the econometrician induces a
spurious positive correlation between productivity and the capital-labor ratio: she
overestimates the productivity of establishments with higher capital-labor ratios.
From the second expression in (2.28), we can state the bias in a slightly different
way. If the econometrician overstates αLi, then she overstates productivity for
establishments facing large labor distortions relative to capital distortions.
The impact of these spurious correlations on measures of misallocation depends
on the underlying correlations between productivity and the capital-labor ratio. To













Note that this expression includes the ratio of the average labor and the average
capital distortions in the industry. By Jensen’s inequality, this ratio need not co-
incide with the average ratio of the labor and capital distortion. Therefore, the
expression in (2.29) is equal to the weighted average of the capital-labor ratio
across establishments only when the two distortions are uncorrelated. While more
general correlation structures do away with this equality, the average in (2.29) al-
ways maps neatly into a comparison of the estimated industry misallocation Φ̂i and

























To fix ideas, consider the case where the labor elasticity is overstated so that
γi > 1. If productivity Aie is positively correlated with the capital-labor ratio, then
the estimated misallocation Φ̂i would overstate true misallocation Φi. More specif-
ically, high productivity establishments would have capital-labor ratios in excess
of the average, so their productivity weights in the numerator of (2.30) would be
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greater than one; the weights for less productive establishments would be smaller
than one. This re-weighting of productivity with relative capital-labor ratios leads
to a misallocation measurement bias.
We can also express the bias in terms of relative distortions. The productivity
weights in the numerator of (2.30) are also the relative labor-capital distortions.
Hence, if more productive establishment systematically face larger relative distor-
tions in hiring labor than capital, then the measurement bias would be positive.
























2.3.2 Mismeasured Capital Elasticity Under Variable Returns to Scale
A common implementation of the constant returns-to-scale production function
from equation (2.5) entails estimating a labor elasticity αLi and assigning the resid-
ual 1 − αLi as the capital elasticity. If this industry’s returns to scale in production
are not constant, then this α̂Ki = 1 − αLi mismeasures the true capital elasticity
αKi. With a correctly-estimated labor elasticity, the labor distortion is still correctly
measured. However, overstating the capital elasticity, so that 1 − αLi exceeds αKi,
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leads the econometrician to overstate the capital distortion:
( ̂1 + τKie) =
1− αLi
αKi
(1 + τKie) .
Once again, despite mismeasuring the level of the distortion, the econometrician







However, if the assumption of constant returns to scale overstates the actual re-






While the erroneous production function leads the econometrician to understate
productivity for all establishments, the degree by which productivity is understated
increases in the establishment’s capital stock. We can highlight two important





ie (1 + τLie)
αLi
(σ−1)(1−βi)
βi+σ(1−βi) (1 + τKie)
[σ−αLi (σ−1)](1−βi)
βi+σ(1−βi) .
First, when βi < 1, the exponents on both distortions are positive. In other
words, when the econometrician overstates the returns to scale, she induces a spu-
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rious positive correlation between productivity and the distortions, and perceives
more distorted establishments as more productive. Second, the exponent on the
productivity term Aie is less than one; productivity is understated for all establish-
ments, but, holding distortions constant, productivity is understated more for the
more productive establishments.
These two forces shape the bias in measured misallocation. By overstating the
returns to scale, the econometrican mistakenly perceives more distorted establish-
ments as more productive. She thinks that industry productivity could be signifi-
cantly improved if only the more productive firms could be rid of their dispropor-
tionately large distortions. This mistaken, or overstated, belief results in an up-
ward bias in measured misallocation. The second force leads to smaller and more
compressed estimates of productivity. If productivity and distortions are indeed

















































We employ two data sets provided by the U.S. Census Bureau to measure mis-
allocation in U.S. manufacturing. The first is the Census of Manufactures (CMF),
which is conducted every five years (during years ending with “2” and “7”) and con-
tains information about all manufacturing establishments in the U.S. The second is
the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM), which is conducted in all non-Census
years and covers a subset of the establishments covered by the CMF. Establish-
ments with at least 250 employees are included in every ASM while plants with
fewer employees are rotated in and out with random sampling every five years.
On average, the ASM surveys 50,000–65,000 establishments selected from the ap-
proximately 350,000 establishments in the CMF. From these datasets, we obtain
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information such as total value of shipments, value added, capital expenditures,
production and non-production workers, material costs and the relevant price de-
flators. In addition, we obtain public data on depreciation rates from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the real rates of return on capital from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA).
Our sample period spans the years from 1977 to 2007. We exclude establish-
ments whose information is imputed from administrative records, as well as those
with missing information in any of the factor variables. We also exclude industries
that contain fewer than five establishments in any given year. To remove outliers,
we trim establishments whose measured physical productivity or TFPR is five times
larger than the industry mean in a given year, as well as those in the one percent
tails.
Over the course of the sample period, industry classification in the U.S. changed
from the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system to the NAICS (North Amer-
ican Industrial Classification System). We use the Fort-Klimek SIC-NAICS concor-
dance to map the changes of industrial codes across years. This concordance pro-
vides each establishment with a time-consistent NAICS 2002 code. For a small
number of the 400+ 6-digit NAICS industries, we identify discontinuities in indus-
try employment and establishment counts around the years where industry classi-
fication changed. If the NAICS dictionaries suggest that the industries in question
are cross-listed, we attempt to merge them into a single industry. When the merg-
ing eliminates discontinuities, we use the merged industries; otherwise, we exclude
the industries from analysis.
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2.5 Mapping the Model to Data
As we highlighted in the introduction, and as previous authors stated, this fam-
ily of models struggles to separately identify the production function parameters
from the distortions faced by the establishments. Our resolution to this problem
entails two steps. First, we show that we do not need to identify the full model in
order to use the model structure to measure misallocation. Specifically, we show
that to measure misallocation, the econometrician needs only the relative level of
the distortions, and not the absolute level; in this manner we eliminate the level
of the average industry distortion as a parameter needed for this exercise. Sec-
ond, we highlight the fact that the model is agnostic about the interpretation of
the distortions. From the model’s perspective, there is one distortion for each of
the two establishment first-order conditions. As a result, there are multiple model-
consistent ways of specifying an establishment profit function: for instance, the
distortions could be on revenue and capital, or, as we model them, on labor and
capital. We show that the latter choice of the profit function, and the accompa-
nying interpretation of the distortions, can help identify parameters for measuring
misallocation.
To emphasize the first point, we return to the expression for misallocation in
equation (2.26), and note that there are three model objects that the econome-
trician needs to measure misallocation: physical productivity (Aie), the relative
revenue productivity (TFPR ratio), and the counterfactual relative revenue pro-
ductivity (TFPR ratio when all distortions are equalized). Of these three objects,
only the second, the relative revenue productivity, requires knowledge of the dis-
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tortions faced by establishments.
Proposition 5. The relative revenue productivity term, TFPRi/TFPRie, can be
rewritten as a function of the relative distortions on factor inputs, i.e. an establish-


















Proof is in Appendix B.2.1.
With this proposition, we now show how the specification of a profit function
can help separately identify the production function parameters, and hence pro-
ductivity, as well as relative distortions. To convey the identification concisely, we
focus on identifying the labor output elasticity, and the relative labor distortions.
Consider the schematic presented in Table 2.1. Across all three model mappings,
we have access to the same U.S. Census observations on an individual establish-
ment.
Column (1) provides the mapping using the profit function in which the dis-
tortions are on the establishment’s revenue and capital input. This is perhaps
the most common choice in the literature, allowing authors to interpret the first
distortion as a distortion to establishment size, and the second as a distortion to
the relative marginal products of capital and labor. In this implementation, the
econometrician interprets the data on Salaries and Wages and Value Added as the
distortion-exclusive objects wiLie and PieYie. However, to obtain the labor output
elasticity from the establishment’s first-order condition for labor, the econometri-
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cian needs the distortion-inclusive (1 − τYie)PieYie. In short, by not knowing the
revenue distortion faced by the establishment, the econometrician mismeasures
the establishment’s marginal cost and hence the denominator of the labor output
elasticity in column (1). Without a correctly-measured production function param-
eter, the econometrician induces the biases detailed earlier in the paper.
Column (2) shows that we can identify the production function elasticity with a
different, model-consistent profit function. If we interpret the distortions as falling
on the labor and capital inputs, we can interpret the same U.S. Census data as
corresponding to (1 + τLie)wiLie and PieYie. In this context, the distortions directly
affect the relative input prices of the establishment, and the labor distortion now
captures establishment-specific variations in the wage paid. With this assumption,
the econometrician has the distortion-inclusive data to correctly measure the elas-
ticity α̂Li. However, she would not be able to measure the level, absolute or rela-
tive, of the labor distortion. The standard approach to inferring the labor distortion
using the first-order condition requires data on the distortion-exclusive wiLie. At-
tempting to plug the distortion-inclusive (1 + τLie)wiLie into the expression would
lead to a measured distortion of unity in the model. As a result, this mapping can
identify the production-function parameter, but not the relative distortions.
Column (3) shows one way in which the identification problem can be resolved.
Using the same profit function as in column (2), the econometrician would again
interpret expenditures on labor in the data as distortion-inclusive. In addition, she
will also leverage an additional establishment-level variable, labor hours (Lie). As
before, she will correctly identify the labor output elasticity. Now, by comparing
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Table 2.1: Identification of Labor Output Elasticity and Distortions
(1) (2) (3)
Unidentified Mapping I Unidentified Mapping II Identified Mapping
Profit function (1− τYie)PieYie − wiLie PieYie − (1 + τLie)wiLie PieYie − (1 + τLie)wiLie
−(1 + τKie)RiKie −(1 + τKie)RiKie −(1 + τKie)RiKie
CMF/ASM Data
Salaries & Wages wiLie (1 + τLie)wiLie (1 + τLie)wiLie
Value Added PieYie PieYie PieYie
Hours Lie Lie Lie

































































the ratio of labor hours to revenue across the establishments, the econometrician
can identify the relative distortion in the industry. This comparison works in the
model as all parameters common to the industry – including the wage, the labor
elasticity, and the elasticity of substitution – cancel out. In a manner that will prove
helpful for comparison across models, this relative distortion is independent of the
production function parameters. In short, while this approach cannot identify all
the model parameters – notably the absolute level of the distortions – it can iden-
tify the production-function parameters and the relative distortions necessary for
measuring misallocation. We explain this mapping in more detail in the following
subsections.
2.5.1 Constant Returns to Scale
For the model with constant returns to scale, we use the establishment first-
order condition for labor to estimate the output elasticity for labor. Taking a sum


















We assume that the observed Salaries and Wages paid by each establishment are
measured inclusive of establishment-specific wages and imply an establishment-
specific distortion 1 + τLie. Given the assumption of constant returns to scale, the
output elasticity for capital αKi is 1− αLi.
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With the production function parameters identified, we can infer physical pro-
ductivity Aie as in equation (2.18). The key challenge is that Census data does not
report physical quantities of output, so we have to rely on the model for a map-
ping between revenue PieYie and output Yie. Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009),




























We normalize the industry-coefficient κi to one. For the purpose of measuring
misallocation, this normalization is inconsequential. This measure of productivity
appears in both the numerator and the denominator of the misallocation expres-
sion Φ in equation (2.26), and hence the industry-wide κi cancels out in the ratio
of counterfactual and actual industry TFP. We can also see this cancellation in the
constant and variable RTS bias expressions (2.30) and (2.32).
As we emphasized at the start of this section, we need only measure relative
distortions to measure misallocation. Calculating the relative distortion allows us
to eliminate all the industry-specific parameters, including the wage wi, the labor






















To identify the capital distortions, we proceed in the same manner, and rearrange




















With the above model objects, we now have all the parameters we need to calculate
misallocation under the assumption of constant returns to scale.
2.5.2 Variable Returns to Scale
For the variable returns to scale model, the labor elasticity and both relative
distortions are estimated as in the previous subsection. Note that, as per Table 2.1,
the measures of relative distortions are independent of the production-function
parameters. The key challenge to implementing the variable returns to scale model
is the estimation of a capital elasticity. To estimate the elasticity αKi, we take
natural logarithms of the production function and arrive at the following regression
framework:
yie,t,j − αLilie,t,j = αKikie,t,j + aie,t,j
yie,t,j − αLilie,t,j = αKikie,t,j + εie,t,j (2.35)
where yie,t, kie,t, lie,t and aie,t are natural logarithms of physical output, capital
stock, labor hours and TFP, respectively.
Our current estimates of αKi come from industry-by-industry regressions of the
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form (2.35) with establishment-level fixed effects. Since the establishment-level
physical productivity (aie,t) is unobserved, we face an omitted variable problem. In
short, if the observed inputs are chosen as a function of the unobserved productiv-
ity that is not accounted for by establishment fixed effects, then this endogeneity
problem would return biased estimates of the capital elasticities.
To address the endogeneity problem in a future version of this paper, we need
a more robust manner of accounting for unobserved changes in physical produc-
tivity. Some papers in this literature have turned to the control-function methods
for estimating production functions, using the tools proposed by Olley and Pakes
(1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). In essence, this literature proposes using
a second equation, often one coming from a cost-minimization problem, to render
unobserved productivity observable. Key assumptions required for this substitution
are that this second equation can (1) be inverted to express unobserved productiv-
ity as a function of the other variables, and that (2) unobserved productivity is the
only unobserved object in this second equation. We think that this family of misal-
location models is not compatible with this second assumption. For instance, the
Olley and Pakes (1996) inversion of the investment function would require that
the investment choice depend only on unobserved productivity; however, in this
model of misallocation, the investment choice would also depend on unobserved
distortions in the capital markets. Similarly, the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) use of
a first-order condition for intermediate inputs would require assuming that estab-
lishments face distortions in their choices of capital and labor, but not in the market
for intermediate inputs. In light of the inconsistency between the assumptions of
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our model and these estimation strategies, we turn to a literature on dynamic panel
estimation.
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (2000) have proposed panel
estimators that can control for unobservable effects at the level of an establishment-
year. In short, these estimators trade off the control-function approach’s second
assumption for more structure on the unobserved productivity process. These pa-
pers derive moment conditions with which the econometrician can jointly estimate
the parameters of the productivity process and the production function using the
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). We are currently implementing these
procedures, and hope to have the updated returns to scale estimates in the next
disclosure.
2.6 Productivity and Distortions in the Data
We begin by summarizing the production-function parameters estimated at the
NAICS-6 level for the models on display in Figure 2.1 from the introduction. The
first column of Table 2.4 shows that the labor output elasticity in the median in-
dustry is 0.61, with an interquartile range between 0.47 and 0.69. The second
column contains estimates of returns to scale, comprising the labor elasticity from
the first column plus the OLS estimates of the capital elasticity estimated using
equation (2.35). These estimates suggest strongly decreasing returns to scale in
production: the median returns to scale is 0.85.
We make two notes about these estimates. First, the labor expenditures re-
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Table 2.2: Summary of Estimated Returns to Scale Coefficients
Labor Output Elasticity αLi Returns to Scale βi = αLi + α
OLS
Ki
25th Percentile 0.4742 0.7475
50th Percentile 0.6080 0.8504
75th Percentile 0.6884 0.9311
ported in the U.S. Census of Manufactures and the Annual Survey of Manufactures
(e.g. salaries and wages) do not include expenditures on benefits for workers. Us-
ing unpublished estimates from the National Compensation Survey run by the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics, we construct adjustment factors reflecting the ratio of
(hourly wage plus hourly benefits) relative to (hourly wage). Since the survey has
a relatively small sample, we are able to construct these adjustment factors at the
NAICS-3 level as 5-year averages overlapping with the 5-year census periods. The
adjustment factors range from 1.35 to 1.92, with a median of 1.52. We provide
more details about these in the data appendix.
Second, the labor elasticity in equation (2.33) depends on the elasticity of sub-
stitution σ. Following the convention in this literature, we make the assumption
that the profits of the monopolistically-competitive establishments in the model
are shared between owners of labor and capital in proportion to the cost shares
of labor and capital in production. By assuming that the total labor expenditure
include the direct payments to labor as well as labor’s share of the profits, the labor
elasticity can then be estimated as the ratio of labor expenditures to value added,
independent of the elasticity σ. The cost of this assumption is fealty to the model.
The benefit is twofold: the production-function parameters do not depend on the
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parameter σ, which we cannot estimate industry by industry. Moreover, as some
papers use values of σ as low as 3, the labor elasticity estimates, without that as-
sumption, would be 1.5 times greater than the ones listed in column 1. Under that
implementation, many industries would have labor elasticities in excess of unity,
making constant RTS models impossible to implement.
Establishment-Level Biases
In the process of characterizing the aggregate bias in measured misallocation,
we first highlight the source of this bias: spurious correlations between productivity
and distortions at the establishment level. In a constant RTS world, equation (2.28)
predicts that when the labor elasticity is overstated, the econometrician induces
a spurious positive correlation between productivity and the capital-labor ratio.
Establishments with higher capital-labor ratios appear more productive, even when
controlling for true physical productivity. Conversely, when the labor elasticity is
understated, establishments with higher capital-labor ratios appear less productive.
















where TFPQie,t is the physical productivity Aie from either the identified model
where production functions vary by industry, or from the “unidentified” model
where a single production function is applied to all industries. Further, Kie,t/Lie,t is
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the capital-labor ratio and φit are industry-times-year fixed effects. All variables are
normalized by demeaning them with their respective industry averages and then
dividing by their industry standard deviations. Looking across all industries, the
first coefficient in column (1) states that, controlling for establishment productivity
in the identified model, a log K/L ratio that is one standard deviation above the
mean is associated with an inferred productivity that is 0.1161 standard deviations
below the mean. Columns (2) and (3) split the sample of industries into those
where the labor elasticity is understated and those where it is overstated. As per
the model predictions, the correlation in column (2) is positive: productivity is
overstated for high-K/L establishments when αLi is overstated. Conversely, pro-
ductivity is understated for high-K/L establishments when αLi is understated, as
per column (3).
Panel B documents these spurious correlations across constant and variable RTS
models. Instead of the log K/L ratio, panel B focuses on a geometric average of the
relative distortions faced by an establishment, where the weights are the labor and
capital elasticities from the variable RTS model. As per equation (2.31), we should
expect overstatements of returns to scale to lead to overstatements of productivity,
and vice versa. As our current estimates of RTS suggest that most industries have
decreasing returns to scale in production, column (1) suggests that, on average,
a one standard deviation increase in the geometric distortion is correlated with a
0.3770 standard deviation increase in constant RTS productivity, even controlling
for variable RTS productivity. Splitting the sample into industries with overstated
and understated RTS, we see a pattern consistent with the bias patterns suggested
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Table 2.3: Measured Physical Productivity and Distortions
Panel A: Constant Returns to Scale, Identified vs Unidentified Bias
Normalized log TFPQ, Unidentified Model
(1) (2) (3)
Normalized log K/L Ratio −0.1161 0.1099 −0.1798
(0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0021)
Normalized log TFPQ 0.9803 0.9713 0.9868
(Industry Elasticity) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Observations 1463000 370000 1093000
R-squared 0.9658 0.9889 0.9820
Cluster Count 12896 4061 8835
Sigma 6 6 6




Industry-Year FE YES YES YES
Panel B: Variable vs Constant Returns to Scale
Normalized log TFPQ, CRTS
(1) (2) (3)
Normalized log Distortion 0.3770 0.3852 −0.1115
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0099)
Normalized log TFPQ 0.6501 0.6544 1.0217
(Variable RTS) 0.0021 0.0020 0.0130
Observations 1456000 1370000 86000
R-squared 0.9780 0.9831 0.9548
Cluster Count 12679 11501 1178
Sigma 6 6 6




Industry-Year FE YES YES YES
Note: An observation is an establishment-year. Clustered standard errors are in parenthe-
sis. Errors are clustered at the industry-year level.
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by equation (2.31). When returns to scale are overstated, as in column (2), so is
productivity for more distorted establishments; the opposite pattern holds when
returns to scale are understated in column (3).
Together, these two panels emphasize just how sensitive the correlation of pro-
ductivity and distortion is to production-function parameters. In isolation, these
correlations are not sufficient to inform us about the bias in measured misalloca-
tion; we breach that gap in the next section.
2.7 Measured Misallocation
Table 2.4 compares industry-level measures of misallocation across different
models. We measure misallocation as the percent increase over industry TFP from
equalizing distortions within the industry. The measure of bias compares these
measures of misallocation across different model specifications. For instance, the
first column of the table differences industry misallocation when the same produc-
tion function is applied to all industries and the same measure when production
functions vary across industries. Across all industry-years, the median increase in
measured misallocation from misspecifying the constant RTS production function
in 5%. There is substantial variation across industry-years, with an inter-quartile
range from just below zero to a bit over 18%. Comparing the constant returns to
scale model to one where returns to scale are potentially non-constant, the median
bias is 33%, with an inter-quartile range of 17% to 58%.
Looking at expression (2.30), we can relate constant RTS misallocation bias to
production-function parameters using two objects. The numerator suggests that
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Table 2.4: Summary of Estimated Returns to Scale Coefficients
Constant RTS Bias Variable RTS Bias
25th Percentile −0.0023 0.1674
50th Percentile 0.0539 0.3387
75th Percentile 0.1846 0.5796
the extent of the bias depends on the direction in which we mismeasure the la-
bor elasticity, as well as the correlation of true productivity and the relative K/L
ratio (henceforth ρ). In short, if we overstate the labor output elasticity, then we
will overstate misallocation in industries where ρ is higher3. Table 2.5 captures
these patterns. When αLi is overstated, then industry-years with a 1% higher cor-
relation of relative K/L and productivity have a 0.3% larger mismeasurement of
misallocation. Similarly, when αLi is understated, then industries with a 1% higher
correlation of inverse K/L and productivity have a 0.5% larger mismeasurement
of misallocation.
With this information in mind, we can now reinterpret Figure 2.1 through the
lens of Tables 2.4 and 2.5. In short, in the U.S. manufacturing data, applying the
same production function to all industries leads to a mismeasurement of the labor
elasticity αLi that is systematically related to the correlation of productivity and
distortions (as seen through variation in the K/L ratio). In industries where αLi
is overstated, the correlation in question is generally high. This pattern leads to
misallocation being overstated for most industries in most years. Consequently,
3To be consistent with equation (2.30), when we understate αLi , the exponent on the relative
K/L ratio becomes negative. Hence, when we understate αLi , we calculate the correlation of pro-
ductivity Aie and the inverse of the relative K/L ratio, ρinverse. Misallocation should be increasing
in ρinverse when αLi is understated.
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aggregate misallocation – an aggregate of sectoral misallocation measures – is sys-
tematically overstated, as in panel A of Figure 2.1.
Table 2.5: Measured Physical Productivity and Distortions
Constant RTS Bias
(1) (2)
Correlation of Relative K/L and A 0.3015
(0.0137)




Labor Output Elasticity OVERSTATED UNDERSTATED
Year FE YES YES
Note: An observation is an establishment-year. Clustered standard errors are in parenthe-
sis. Errors are clustered at the industry-year level.
2.8 Conclusion
We highlight the challenge of separately identifying production function pa-
rameters and measures of distortions in a family of commonly used models for
quantifying misallocation. Resolving this identification challenge is particularly
important because mismeasured production-function parameters induce spurious
correlations between productivity and distortions that bias measures of misalloca-
tion. We propose a way to identify this model in two steps. First, we show that we
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need only measure relative distortions to measure misallocation. By removing the
absolute levels of distortions from the parameter space for identifying misalloca-
tion, we show that we need not identify the whole model to identify the measure
of interest. Second, we emphasize that multiple specifications of the profit func-
tions are consistent with these wedge-like distortions in establishment first order
conditions. Given the data available to the econometrician, we highlight the one
specification that can be implemented.
90
CHAPTER III
Multinational Corporations in the U.S.: A Profile of
their U.S. Employment (with Vanessa Alviarez,
Nicholas Bloom, Kyle Handley and Brian Lucking)1
3.1 Introduction
Multinational corporations (MNCs) have a major impact on the global economy
as they account for more than 50% of the world’s GDP in recent years, as well as
a significant portion of countries’ employment and global trade. The employment
and wage impact of U.S. MNCs’ imports – offshoring – from low wage countries,
such as China and Vietnam, has remained at the center-stage politically and eco-
nomically. Rising global trade is likely to continue playing an important role in
labor-market polarization and the decline of manufacturing activity.
1DISCLAIMER: "Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and
do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Census Bureau. All results have been reviewed
to ensure that no confidential information is disclosed." Bloom and Handley thank the Russell Sage
Foundation and Handley thanks the W.E. Upjohn Institute for financial support.
91
Measuring the extent of multinational activity and its employment effects is dif-
ficult. For example, suppose General Electric (GE) closes down a light-bulb factory
in Alabama. Those jobs may have been replaced by foreign workers, i.e. offshored,
but maybe GE just decided to stop producing light-bulbs. Perhaps GE decided to
outsource production to another U.S. producer, or perhaps it reduced domestic
employment in manufacturing of light bulbs, but offset those jobs by increasing
employment in design, engineering and wholesaling functions.
Figure 3.1: Cumulative employment change at domestically-owned and majority-
owned foreign operations of non-bank U.S. multinationals (left axis) and imports
from affiliates (right axis)
MNCs employed 28.6 million U.S. workers in 2011, accounting for 25% of the
total U.S. wage income. Figure 3.1 plots the cumulative employment changes at the
domestic and foreign operations of U.S. multinationals. During most of the 2000s,
overseas employment at majority owned affiliates of U.S. multinationals was grow-
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ing while domestic employment at multinationals was flat or falling rapidly. At the
same time, imports from foreign owned affiliates were increasing. This is strongly
suggestive of the type of employment offshoring that was alarming to policy mak-
ers. Increased import competition is both a cause and a consequence of increased
offshoring. Greater low-wage import competition, especially from China, reduces
wages and employment (Autor and Dorn, 2013; Pierce and Schott, 2016; Hummels
et al., 2014). It also changes the nature of the employer-employee relationship and
wage bargaining (Bertrand, 2004). Another line of research has investigated the
employment and wage effects of offshoring, finding a range of effects depending
on the time period, industry, or country groups (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996).
More importantly though, while the evidence in Figure 3.1 is suggestive, we
cannot begin to measure and assess the role of multinational activities on employ-
ment growth and reallocation without a relevant comparison group. Returning to
our light bulb example, perhaps employment declined at all firms in the lighting
and small appliance industries, or at other large, legacy manufacturing operations,
regardless of their global footprint. Many previous studies for the U.S. have been
limited in this regard by the scope and availability of data. First, they rely on either
the intensity of importing and exporting or the type of trade participation, arm’s
length vs. related party trade, to identify offshoring or the multinational status
of firms. While these trade relationships are interesting in their own right, they
may generate many false positives as a multinational identifier. For example, the
threshold for related-party trade reporting, 6 percent or higher for imports and 10
percent for exports, are well below the measure for majority ownership or even
93
levels that would confer sufficient control rights. Second, data sources that only
survey or identify multinational firms cannot be used to compare multinationals
to non-multinational firms that operate domestically or engage in importing and
exporting at arm’s length. These data sources may be used to identify differentials
in employment among multinational firms, but are not well-suited for aggregate
assessments of employment effects of multinationals. Third, most studies do not
have longitudinal establishment level data within a multinational firm. This makes
it very difficult, or impossible, to study employment reallocation within the firm.
In particular, firms may shift employment substantially across units, open and close
establishments, or grow through acquisitions and divestitures. These changes are
not observed with firm and industry level data, and so the full scope and mag-
nitude of employment reallocation and employment growth at MNCs relative to
otherwise similar firms cannot be disentangled.
Our approach aims to measure the aggregate employment growth and reallo-
cation effects of MNCs in the U.S. over the past decade and across manufacturing,
retail, wholesale and service sectors. At a fundamental level, understanding the
contribution of MNCs to U.S. employment growth in contrast to non-MNCs is the
first-order issue. Do MNCs account disproportionately for the decline in U.S. man-
ufacturing employment? Did they grow faster relative to their domestic counter-
parts? Did they create and destroy more jobs at new and existing establishments
relative to controls? And, given that MNCs are often vertically integrated and op-
erate multiple lines of business, in what sectors did they create and destroy jobs?
We answer these questions by exploiting a novel combination of two detailed
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firm level datasets: the restricted-use U.S. Census Bureau establishment-level mi-
crodata and the Bureau van Dijk Orbis database. The Orbis database has detailed
information about ownership linkages between firms and across countries. The
combined Census-Orbis dataset links firm and establishment-level activity to the
scope and extent of a firm’s global operations. To our knowledge, this is the first
time these data have been linked and the detailed exploration as described above
is unavailable elsewhere. By carefully matching the names and addresses between
the firms in the Orbis database with the universe of U.S. firms in the confidential
database at the U.S. Census, we can identify the U.S. firms and establishments
that are part of a larger multinational operation; either being majority-owned U.S.
affiliates of foreign multinationals firms or U.S. parent firms that have majority-
owned operations overseas. In summary, the Census-Orbis dataset provides a more
complete characterization of the operation of firms located in the U.S. and their
linkages to operations overseas. Coupled with their trade transactions, we are able
to further distinguish between intra-firm trade from arm’s length trade.
This paper begins by analyzing the difference in overall employment growth
rates between U.S. MNCs, foreign MNCs, exporters, importers and domestically-
owned firms. Then, we analyze employment growth differentials of MNCs relative
to controls for each component of net employment growth; i.e. job creation, in-
cluding births and positive changes in employment at continuing establishments,
and job destruction, including deaths and negative changes in employment at con-
tinuing establishments. We find that the overall employment growth rate varies
substantially by firm-type, with MNCs having a positive and significant premium
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when compared with non-MNCs.
This paper is related to recent studies which look at the differential employ-
ment effects of MNCs, and the effects of offshoring by MNCs on domestic labor
market outcomes. Autor et al. (2013) find that commuting zones that are more
exposed to imports from China experienced larger reductions in manufacturing
employment. Boehm et al. (2015) use firm ownership data from LexisNexis and
similar Census micro data, and find that U.S. MNCs experienced larger declines in
employment compared to similar domestically-owned manufacturers. Hummels
et al. (2014), using matched employer-employee level data for manufacturing
firms in Denmark, find that firms that increased imports experienced significant
reductions in employment levels. An important distinction between these papers
and ours is that they focused specifically on manufacturing employment. Yet, the
vast majority of MNCs with operations in the manufacturing sector also operate in
non-manufacturing sectors, such as retail, wholesale, information, professional ser-
vices, administrative support, and management. By considering a firm’s activities
beyond the manufacturing sector, we take into account the substantial reorgani-
zation that could take place within the firm as it adjusts its employment level in
manufacturing while expanding operations in services establishments (see Mag-
yari (2016) for a recent study). Hijzen et al. (2011) analyze an extensive margin
of multinationals’ offshoring using data on French firms from 1987–1999. They
find that when multinationals create new production affiliates abroad, the effects
on domestic employment depend on the type of offshoring – the opening of new
affiliates of manufacturing firms in high- (low-) income countries is associated with
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increases (no change) in domestic employment.
One of the main reasons MNCs might respond differently to a reduction in the
cost of purchasing intermediates from abroad is that they can both adjust the ex-
tent of their local operations and reallocate production across their network of
foreign affiliates within the corporate group. Therefore, the response of a multina-
tional firm operating in the U.S. will depend on the extent of its operations across
countries and sectors outside the U.S., relative to the activities performed locally.
Another reason why we could expect a differential employment effect by multi-
national firms is due to their ability to perform intra-firm trade transactions across
borders. Multinationals’ sourcing patterns are distinctive across goods, with some
intermediate inputs being sourced from their own affiliates and others from un-
related parties (often in different countries)2. Moreover, it is possible that the
local employment response to an increase in intra-firm imports differs from that of
arm’s length imports, because the goods produced within the same multinational
firm can reduce the overall uncertainty relative to the stability of the shipments
and the compliance with product specifications.
Several papers have analyzed the effects of MNCs using firm-level data on U.S.
MNCs from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Kovak et al. (2015) find
that offshoring increases employment at U.S. MNCs, while Harrison and McMil-
lan (2011) find that the effects of offshoring U.S. MNCs are heterogeneous, and
depend on whether the tasks performed by foreign affiliates are likely to be more
2This is consistent with a feature of the Danish dataset highlighted in Hummels et al. (2014),
who find that firms concentrate their imports purchases on a narrow set of goods that is largely
unique to each firm.
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or less similar to that performed by domestic workers. Desai et al. (2009) find that
increases in investment and wages at foreign affiliates of U.S. MNCs are associated
with increases in domestic investment and wages. A limitation of these analyses
is that the BEA dataset only includes MNCs, so it is difficult to compare MNCs to
similar domestically-owned firms using this data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
main features of our dataset by providing details of the Orbis and U.S. Census
datasets, respectively, followed by a section comparing our dataset with the public-
use dataset on MNCs collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Next,
we describe the decomposition of employment growth rates and our empirical ap-
proach. We then present our baseline empirical evidence, establishing the role
of MNCs in aggregate U.S. employment. Finally, we further decompose the role
of MNCs in U.S. employment growth by looking at job creation and destruction
measures, as well as establishment births and deaths.
3.2 Towards a New Comprehensive Database of Multinational
Corporations in the U.S.
We combined the Bureau van Dijk Orbis worldwide database of firms (hereafter
referred to as the Orbis database) with several restricted-use datasets at the U.S.
Census to construct a matched Orbis-Census database that is suitable for the anal-
ysis of multinational corporations. This dataset would provide a more detailed and
holistic picture of the operations of MNCs that operate in the U.S.
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The Orbis database contains information such as contact details, industry af-
filiation and financial data, for both public listed and non-listed firms. The most
striking feature of this database is the detailed ownership information of direct and
indirect shareholders as well as subsidiaries for each firm.
Meanwhile, the restricted-use datasets at the U.S. Census, i.e. the Longitudinal
Business Dataset (LBD) and the Longitudinal Foreign Trade Transaction Database
(LFTTD), contain a wide range of establishment and firm-level information of the
universe of firms operating in the U.S., including their employment information
(number of employees and payroll) and international trade transactions at the
finest level of product disaggregation.
By combining these datasets in a unified framework, we offer a unique portrait
of the activity carried out by MNCs. First, we are able to identify the multinational
status of firms located in the U.S., distinguishing between U.S. MNCs based in
the U.S.; affiliates of foreign corporations operating in the U.S.; and domestically-
owned (non-MNCs) firms. Second, through the ownership linkages in Orbis, we
can track the operations of the network of U.S. foreign affiliates abroad, as well
as the overseas operations of affiliates of foreign parents, including their activities
in the source country. Finally, it allows for the construction of an alternative mea-
sure of intra-firm trade by tracking trade transactions between foreign exporters
and U.S. importers within the same corporation. Hence, the Orbis-Census dataset
allows us to identify both counterparts of each international trade transaction for
U.S. imports.
This combined dataset will overcome some of the limitations of past studies on
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MNCs. There are three datasets that have often been used to study MNCs: Orbis,
LFTTD, and the multinational database at the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Despite the richness of each of these datasets individually, they have important
shortcomings that can be overcome by combining them in a unified framework.
First, the main advantage of Orbis is the scope and accuracy of firms’ ownership
information. But, it lacks information on the exporting and importing activities
carried out by these firms.3 Second, the LFTTD contains detailed information of
U.S. firms’ international trade transactions. Furthermore, it specifies whether each
trade transaction is carried out with a related or unrelated party in a foreign mar-
ket. For importers, in particular, the LFTTD provides an identifier for the foreign
exporter. It does not, however, have information on the degree of ownership or any
financial information about these foreign firms. Finally, the BEA dataset contains
information of production, employment and trade for U.S. MNCs and affiliates of
foreign MNCs operating in the U.S., but it does not contain detailed exports and
imports information (e.g. trade by country and/or by product). Another downside
of this dataset is that it only covers MNCs, making it impossible to compare the
performance of multinationals relative to exporters that are non-MNCs and purely
domestically-owned (non-MNC) firms.
3.2.1 Identifying Multinationals in Orbis
In this section, we describe how MNCs with operations in the U.S. are identified
from the Orbis dataset. From the firm-level ownership information, we are able to
3Moreover, due to confidential agreements of Bureau van Dijk’s information provider in the U.S.,
Orbis does not contain the complete annual financial information for firms located in the U.S.
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build a network of firms that are related through ownership linkages. Then, we
can identify each corporation’s country of origin and its international coverage
(the number of firms and countries of operation). One possible method that could
be undertaken to achieve this is to identify the parent company of the corporation.
Then, all firms that are properly identified to be owned by this parent company
will be members of the corporation.
There are two challenges in accurately identifying a parent company in the
Orbis dataset. First, if taken purely at face value, the different levels of ownership
information provided by Orbis may lead researchers to draw the wrong conclusion
of the true ownership structure of a corporation. For each firm, Orbis provides
three different levels of ownership that can be used to identify the parent company
for a given firm. They are: (1) the global ultimate owner (GUO), which exercises
the greatest degree of control over the firm and is not itself controlled by any other
company; (2) the domestic ultimate owner (DUO), which is the highest company
in the ownership pyramid located in the same country as the firm; and (3) the
immediate shareholder (ISH), which is the largest direct shareholder of the firm
and may or may not be located in the same country.
All three ownership measures are useful, but no one alone can accurately iden-
tify the extent of a corporation that would be meaningful for our analysis. The
immediate shareholder (ISH) of a firm, which is its largest direct owner, could
lead us to believe that a company is domestically owned when it is actually foreign
owned. For instance, according to Orbis, Samsung Semiconductor Europe Limited
in the U.K. is directly owned by Samsung Electronics Co, a company also located
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in the U.K. Nonetheless the global ultimate owner of both firms is Samsung Elec-
tronics Co., Ltd located in Korea. In fact, we show in the appendix that using the
ISH alone will lead to 20 percent of foreign affiliates in a given country being mis-
classified as domestically-owned, even when, in reality, they are part of a global
network. Furthermore, by using the ISH alone, one may correctly conclude that a
firm is foreign-owned but incorrectly identify the country of origin. For instance,
based on the ISH, Volkswagen France will be classified as foreign-owned with its
country of origin being Italy, since it is directly owned by Volkswagen Italy. In re-
ality, its global ultimate owner is in Germany. We find that if researchers were to
use the ISH alone to identify ownerships, about 15 percent of foreign firms will be
correctly classified as foreign-owned but attributed to a wrong country of origin.
Some of these problems can be overcome by using the GUO instead. But, as we
shall describe next, the GUO indicator also has important drawbacks.
The second challenge in correctly identifying a parent company is that the
dataset defines ownership in terms of financial shareholding, which does not neces-
sarily correspond to the notion of management control implied in most economic
models of trade and multinational production. These models define a multina-
tional corporation as an entity that performs innovation and production activities
in different countries through its network of affiliates whose operations are man-
aged by a common parent firm. In most models, the parent firm is an entity that
makes strategic decisions for the corporation, such as the location of its affiliates,
choices and levels of production, and other strategic issues. For example, through
the lens of the model, we would expect all of Ford’s affiliates that design, assemble
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and produce in other countries to be owned by Ford Motors Co. which is located in
the U.S., the home country of the headquarter of the corporation. Similarly, world-
wide affiliates belonging to the Toyota corporation should have Toyota Co., which
is located in Japan, as their parent company. The extent to which the ownership
structure obtained from Orbis can provide this picture of global ownership of firms
is one key reason why this data source can be a useful resource in our study of
MNCs.
Ownership structures are often complex, however, and there are several sit-
uations in which the parent company defined in terms of the highest financial
shareholder may not be the same as the the actual management parent. It is not
unusual for MNCs to create holding companies to manage their assets, patents,
trade marks, etc. For tax purposes, these are located in a country different to the
source country where the management body or the company resides. For example,
Cisco System Italy S.R.L. is categorized to be ultimately owned by Cisco ISH B.V,
a holding company located in the Netherlands. In reality, it is part of a U.S. multi-
national corporation. Furthermore, some firms are majority owned by financial
institutions such as banks, insurance companies or mutual funds4.
Therefore, we propose combining the best features of the GUO and ISH iden-
tifiers to determine the boundaries of corporations and their countries of origin.
Under this proposed method, the identity of the parent company per se is not
what matters the most. Instead, we introduce the concept of a corporate group in
addressing these challenges. A corporate group refers to a conglomerate of compa-
4For example Citibank, BNP Paribas and Deloitte are categorized by Orbis to be global ultimate
owners and immediate shareholders of many industrial companies.
103
nies related by ownership ties, sharing a common parent that exerts management
control over the group. First, to avoid creating spurious corporate groups in which
the GUOs are financial institutions, we restrict our dataset to only GUOs that are
industrial firms. Second, we group all firms that share a common GUO, DUO and
ISH to be in the same corporate group. Third, we assign the country of origin of
each corporate group in the following way. In cases in which the country of ori-
gin of the GUO is the same as that of the ISH, then we will designate that to be
the country of origin for all firms in the corporate group5. In other cases, we rely
on other financial indicators to help determine the country of origin of the corpo-
rate group. For this, we calculate the total assets, revenue, employment and the
number of affiliates of the corporation in each country in which it has operations.
Finally, we conduct an exhaustive examination through visual inspection in order
to correct for any discernible errors. Specifically, we manually inspected firms in
the upper tail of the size-sector distribution and also corporate groups for which
we have not been able to fully employ the above steps.
3.2.2 U.S. Census Data
We employ three restricted-use firm and establishment level datasets at the U.S.
Census for this paper. First, we matched our Orbis dataset with the Business Regis-
ter (Standard Statistical Establishment List (SSEL)) to create a bridge file. Amongst
others, the Business Register contains the names and addresses of business entities
5Whenever the country of origin is a tax haven economy, we will investigate manually by search-
ing the history of the firms within the corporate group and make manual adjustments whenever
necessary.
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with paid employees in the U.S. (Jarmin and Miranda, 2002). The name and
address information on the Business Register are used as our primary inputs for
matching the Orbis dataset to the other micro datasets at the U.S. Census. Further
details on the matching procedure are discussed below.
For the entities that are matched, we obtained their firm and establishment
identifiers from the Business Register and used these identifiers to merge to the
Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) and the Longitudinal Firm Trade Transac-
tions Database (LFTTD). In the LBD, we excluded establishments that are out-of-
scope for County Business Patterns. For the remaining in-scope establishments, we
obtained the number of employees for each establishment as well as the establish-
ment’s industry code at the NAICS 6-digit level6. For analysis at the firm-level, we
summed the total number of employees for all establishments that share the same
firm identifier and defined the aggregated value to be the number of employees of
that given firm. For multi-unit firms, we undertook an intermediate step whereby
we summed the number of employees for all establishments that share the same
NAICS 3-digit industry code. We defined the firm’s industry sector to be the NAICS
3-digit industry in which the firm has the highest number of employees.
The LFTTD is a firm-level dataset of the universe of imports and exports trade
transactions data collected by the Customs Bureau. Amongst others, the dataset
contains variables such as the value of the transaction, product code (Harmonized
System) and the country of origin or destination. Hence, in addition to our multi-
national identifier, we are also able to identify MNCs that import and/or export
6That is, the most recent census year NAICS code reported for the establishment. Census years
refer to years ending in “2” or “7” (i.e. 1982, 1997).
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from merging our baseline dataset with the LFTTD.
3.2.3 Matching Orbis with the Business Register at the U.S. Census
We match the names and addresses of firms that we have identified to be multi-
nationals from the Orbis dataset to the Business Register’s names and addresses
records7. For any given year of Orbis firms, we first matched these firms to the
Business Register for that given year. We recognize that the timing of these two
datasets may differ (for example, due to different fiscal years and financial state-
ments dates in Orbis). As such, for Orbis firms that are unmatched, we would also
search for them in adjacent years in the Business Register.
We start our matching procedure with a conservative exact match on names
and addresses (i.e. street address and zipcode). For Orbis firms that remain un-
matched, we next employed a fuzzy matching algorithm. This algorithm works
by constructing a match code for the combination of a firm’s name and address,
by taking into consideration possible variations in the spelling of a firm’s name
and street address. A more detailed explanation of our procedure is provided in
Appendix C.1.
Matching based on names and addresses presented us with several challenges.
First, we encountered cases of non-unique (none one-to-one) matches. A “firm”
in Orbis could be matched to multiple firms in the Business Register in a given
year. This situation could arise due to the different definition of a “firm” used in
7Our filtering procedure of the Orbis dataset allows for us to also identify purely domestically-
owned firms that have ownership linkages but only within the U.S. We also included these firms in
our matching procedure for completeness.
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the construction of the two datasets. Given that our goal is to identify MNCs in
the Business Register, we would then designate that all of the multiple matches in
the Business Register be MNCs if the Orbis firm that is matched is a multinational.
In other words, the characteristic of the Orbis firm would be “passed on” to the
matched Business Register firms. On the other hand, the opposite case of multiple
Orbis firms being matched to one Business Register firm could also arise. In most
instances, the multiple Orbis firms that are matched would belong to a single cor-
porate group. Here, our definition of a corporate group helps to resolve this issue.
Since a corporate group would have a unique identification of its multinational sta-
tus (and its country of origin), we would assign the characteristics of the corporate
group directly to the matched firm in the Business Register.
After this round of matching, we would then verify that our matches are sen-
sible. First, we combined the firms that we have matched with the LFTTD and
calculated the aggregate value of trade (imports and exports) for MNCs and non-
MNCs. Based on earlier studies, we know that a significant proportion of the U.S.’
international trade transactions is carried out by MNCs. We find similar results in
our analysis.
Upon matching and verifying that the matches are valid, we obtain the es-
tablishments associated with the firms that are matched from the LBD. Tracking
establishments is important in our analysis as we are interested in examining how
MNCs create and destroy jobs across the various margins of births/deaths of estab-
lishments, at continuing establishments, and through acquisitions and divestitures.
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3.3 External Validity of the Matched Dataset
In this section, we provide some descriptive statistics pertaining to the pattern
of employment and trade of MNCs in the U.S., and compare that with the public-
used data provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Table 3.1 compares the employment levels of U.S. parents and U.S. affiliates of
foreign parents as calculated in our matched dataset, with the employment levels
reported by the BEA. Specifically, this table reports the employment statistics for
two Census years (2007 and 2012) and for four broad industries. From the upper
panel of Table 3.1, we note that the total employment for U.S. multinationals and
foreign-owned multinationals in 2012 closely matched the corresponding values as
measured by the BEA. Specifically, our matched dataset reports a marginally lower
total number of employees of U.S. parents in the U.S. (lower by 3.1%) but closely
matched the total number of employees of foreign affiliates in the U.S. (lower by
0.1%). Nevertheless, there are discrepancies in the industrial employment com-
position in both datasets. In particular, the matched dataset captures 77% of the
manufacturing employment by foreign affiliates in the U.S. and around half of the
manufacturing employment (51.6%) of U.S. parents, relative to the BEA values.
For the other sectors, the matched dataset overestimates the number of employ-
ees in wholesale, retail and services sectors by 12.5% (12%), 27.1% (19.3%), and
12.5% (12.5%), for U.S. parent and foreign affiliates in the U.S, respectively.
There are two possible reasons for these discrepancies. First, in Table 3.1, em-
ployment has been aggregated based on the industry of the establishment, rather
than based on the industry of the firm, which can be assigned on an employment-
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weighted basis for multi-unit firms. Second, in terms of the differences in total
employment in 2012, the publicly available BEA dataset reports the employment
level of all U.S. parents and U.S. affiliates of foreign parents (which include par-
ents and affiliates of both banks and non-banks) while we have explicitly omitted
financial institutions from our Orbis dataset.
3.4 Decomposing Employment Growth
In this paper, we wish to examine how MNCs contribute towards aggregate
employment changes in the U.S. economy over time. To do so, we consider how
employment changes reflect the contributions of continuing establishments within
a firm, births of new establishments, and deaths of existing establishments.
As is now standard in the study of business dynamics, the following definitions
are used in the decomposition of net job creation into the different margins as
discussed in the main text. First, at the establishment level, job creation (JC) and
job destruction (JD) are defined as:
JCet = max(get, 0) , and
JDet = max(−get, 0) .
For establishments that newly enter in period t, the job creation rate would be +2,
while for establishments that exit in period t, the job destruction rate would be −2.
To aggregate up to the firm level, we obtain the following expressions for the
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Net job creation (NetJCit) within the firm is defined as the difference between the
number of gross job gains (JCit) and the number of gross job losses (JDit) within
the firm.
NetJCit = JCit − JDit
Using establishments details, we decomposed gross job gains into the contribution

















We employ the mid-point growth measure by normalizing the gross job flows by
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As discussed in previous studies on job dynamism in the U.S. (e.g. Haltiwanger et
al. (2013)), high churning rates during healthy economic times have contributed
towards productivity growth of the U.S. economy. Specifically, in the context of
this study on MNCs, we are interested in examining if the churning rate of MNCs
is substantially different from that of non-MNCs.
Churningit = JCit + JDit
We also measure the excess reallocation rate of firms following the definition given
in Davis et al. (1996). This measures the total amount of churn that is over and
above that which is due to net changes in employment.
Excess Reallocationit = JCit + JDit − |JCit − JDit|
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3.5 Empirical Approach
The main contribution of this paper is that we introduce multinational indica-
tors in our analysis of business dynamics of U.S. firms. We use a nonparametric
regression approach to estimate these relationships (see Haltiwanger et al. (2012)
and Haltiwanger et al. (2013) for similar approaches conducted in different set-
tings). Our first set of regressions would be to compare the employment outcomes
for MNCs with non-MNCs.
∆empji,t,t−1 = β0 + β1MNC
All
i + νi,t + εi,t , (3.3)
whereMNCAlli is a binary indicator; 1 for firms that we have identified through our
matches to the Orbis dataset as a multinational (regardless of ownership status8)
and 0 otherwise9. νi,t is the size × age × industry × multi-unit status fixed effects.
The main dependent variable is the annual net job flow at the firm level. Later,
we will describe the various decompositions that we conducted to measure their
contributions towards the firm’s total net job flow. Next, we split theMNCAll group
into US-owned MNC and foreign-owned MNC. We then ran the following regression.




i + νi,t + εi,t , (3.4)
8This indicator includes both U.S.-owned multinationals and U.S. affiliates of foreign-owned
multinationals.
9The omitted group includes all US-firms in the LBD that we did not match to the ORBIS MNC
indicators and also ORBIS firms that we matched but were identified to be purely domestic.
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where MNCUSi is a binary indicator with 1 for firms that we have identified
through our matches to be US-owned MNC and 0 otherwise; and MNCFi is a bi-
nary indicator with 1 for firms that we have identified through our matches to
be Foreign-owned MNC and 0 otherwise. The omitted group in this regression is
similar to that in equation (3.3).
Our third set of regressions involves further splitting the non-MNC firms into
four sub-groups; firms that engaged in exporting only, firms that engaged in im-
porting only, and firms that engaged in both exporting and importing activities.




i + β3Expi + β4Impi + β5Bothi + νi,t + εi,t
(3.5)
where Impi is a binary indicator with 1 for firms that engaged in importing only,
0 otherwise; Expi is 1 for firms that engaged in exporting only, 0 otherwise, and
Bothi is 1 for firms that engaged in both importing and exporting activities, 0
otherwise. Therefore, the omitted group in this specification would be non-MNC
firms that do not engage in any international trade activity.
In terms of the decomposition of firm’s employment outcomes, we first de-
composed the firm’s total annual net job flows across the following margins: job
creation of continuing establishments, births and acquisitions; and job destruction
at continuing establishments, deaths and divestitures.
We also examined the decomposition of firm’s employment outcomes by the
sectoral composition of the firm’s establishments. Consider a multi-unit firm which
owns establishments in the manufacturing sector (NAICS 31, 32 or 33) and also
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in the wholesale trade sector (NAICS 42). By aggregating the total employment of
the firm up to the firm-sector level, we can then decompose the firm’s annual net










We will then repeat the decomposition for all the other margins (job creation at
continuers, births, etc.) along the firm-sector dimension. The above regressions are
estimated two ways: unweighted and weighted. The weights used in the weighted
regressions are constructed by weighting the changes in the firm’s employment
outcomes by the firm’s average employment between period t− 1 and t.
Next, we examine the role of international trade on the employment outcomes
of MNCs. As a baseline measure of related-party trade, we first used the indicators
provided in the LFTTD10. We estimated the following regression.
















































νi,t + εi,t (3.6)
with RP ki,t being defined as either a binary indicator (1 for firm i that engaged
10In future work, we intend to develop our own measures of related-party indicators based on
the variables in our matched dataset.
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in any related party import or export transactions in year t, 0 otherwise and k
indicating imports or exports) or a continuous variable (natural log of the value of
related party imports or exports in year t).
3.6 Empirical Evidence
3.6.1 Higher total employment growth rates for MNCs relative to non-MNCs
Table 3.9 reports the weighted regression results for our baseline regression
specification. In Column (1), we find that with year fixed effects only, the employ-
ment growth rate for MNCs is not significantly different when compared with non-
MNCs. However, with a fully-saturated regression model, the sign of the coefficient
on the MNC indicator is positive and significant. The average annual employment
growth rate for MNCs is 5.1 percentage points higher than that for non-MNCs.
This result suggests that a simple comparison of the mean growth rates between
MNCs and non-MNCs would indicate that there is no significant difference in the
two groups’ employment growth rate. However, once we compare these MNC firms
with a suitably defined control group; that is, non-MNC firms with similar charac-
teristics (age, size, industry, multi-unit status), we find that MNCs register higher
employment growth rates.
When we analyze the differences between the different types of multination-
als; i.e. between the U.S.-owned MNCs and the U.S. affiliates of foreign-owned
MNCs, we find that the coefficients on the U.S. MNC and foreign MNC indicators
are broadly similar (see Column (4)). This suggests that there is no significant dif-
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ference in the employment growth rates between U.S.-owned and foreign-owned
MNCs.
Upon decomposing the total net employment growth rates between gross job
creation and gross job destruction, we find that MNCs create more and destroy
fewer jobs than non-MNCs. MNCs’ job creation rate is 4.2 percentage points higher
than non-MNCs (Table 3.10) while their job destruction rate is 0.9 percentage
points lower than non-MNCs (Table 3.11). The birth and acquisition of estab-
lishments account for most of the MNCs’ job creation premium. Meanwhile, the
destruction of fewer jobs by continuing establishments accounts for most of the
MNCs’ lower job destruction rate.
Given that MNCs recorded higher rates of hiring and firing relative to non-
MNCs, this is reflected in the higher job churning rate of MNCs (+3.3 percentage
points) as shown in Panel A of Table 3.12). In addition, the excess reallocation rate
of MNCs is also higher (+2.4 percentage points).
3.6.2 MNCs are creating relatively more jobs across all sectors - notably, in
the services sector
One of the goals of this study is to measure the sectoral contribution of the
employment outcomes of MNCs. Towards this end, Table 3.13 shows the results
of firm-sector decomposition of net employment growth by the broad sectors of
manufacturing, wholesale trade, retail trade and services. For a single-unit firm,
the sector of the firm is given in the LBD11. For a multi-unit firm, we aggregated up
11The industry codes of the establishments are recorded in the LBD at the NAICS 6 digit level.
We consider a sector to be at the NAICS 1-digit level.
116
the employment of its establishments according to their sectors.
We find that the employment growth rates of MNCs are higher than those of
non-MNCs across all sectors. Although total employment in the manufacturing
sector has been declining in the U.S. over time (see Table 3.3), we find that the
decline has not been more severe in MNCs in the time period that we are exam-
ining. On the contrary, the employment growth of MNCs in the manufacturing
sector is 1 percentage point higher than non-MNCs. Moreoever, we find that the
employment growth premium of MNCs is significantly higher in the services sector
(+3 percentage points). On average, the services sector contributes 60 percent of
the total employment growth premium of MNCs. Looking more specifically at the
sectoral contribution for the different ownership structures of MNCs, we find that
the sectoral contribution of the services sector is the largest for both U.S.-owned
MNCS as well as for U.S. affiliates of foreign MNCs, relative to that of non-MNCs
(Table 3.14).
3.6.3 U.S.-owned MNCs that also import exhibit lower employment growth
rates
Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 describe two features of the international trade activities
of MNCs in the U.S. First, we note that on average, U.S.-owned MNCs both import
from and export to a higher number of countries relative to affiliates of foreign-
owned MNCs as well as other non-MNC importers. Second, MNCs (both U.S. and
foreign owned) imported a significantly higher number of products (measured at
the HS-10 level) compared to other non-MNC importers. Furthermore, U.S.-owned
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MNCs also exported significantly higher number of products relative to foreign-
owned MNCs and other non-MNC exporters. This finding is consistent with the
results from past studies that found that the bulk of international trade transactions
in the U.S. has been conducted by MNCs.
In terms of related party trade values, Table 3.8 shows that more than two-
thirds of the total imports of foreign-owned MNCs have been recorded as related-
party transactions. While still high, the share for U.S.-owned MNCs is lower, at
slightly less than half. This finding is also consistent with the view that MNCs have
globally integrated production chains; such that they are active in both sourcing
and selling their products and inputs between affiliates across national bound-
aries12.
Table 3.15 reports the relationship between importing, exporting and multina-
tional status on firms’ employment growth rates. In this table, the related party
indicators are binary (i.e. defined to be equal to one as long as the firm recorded
any value of related-party imports or exports). In column (1), we find that when
we look at firm employment across all sectors, on average, for U.S.-owned MNCs
that imported on a non-related party trade basis, the marginal effect of non-related
party import is negative on the firm’s employment growth. A similar pattern of neg-
ative marginal effect is observed across all major sectors (see Columns (2) to (5)).
In terms of related-party trade, we do not observe a negative marginal effect for
overall firm employment for all sectors13. Table 3.16 presents the related party and
12Table 3.8 also shows positive shares for non-MNCs. Such cases arise because of the low per-
centage share of ownership that is used to define a related-party transaction in the LFTTD.
13Sectorally, only the Wholesale Trade sector shows a small negative marginal effect.
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non related party trade variables in terms of the natural logarithms of their values.
The signs and significance levels of the marginal effects of non-related party log
imports for U.S.-owned MNCs are similar to that presented in Table 3.15. For all
sectors, on average, a one percent increase in non-related party import is associ-
ated with a 0.4 percentage point decline in annual employment growth rates.
In subsequent work, we intend to directly estimate the effect of changes in
imports at the firm level on employment growth and reallocation measures. Be-
cause of the obvious simultaneity problem that import levels and growth may be
correlated with demand and supply shocks at the firm, we propose to use an in-
strumental variables strategy to address this endogeneity problem.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper measures the aggregate employment growth and reallocation effects
of multinational firms in the U.S. over the past decade and across the manufactur-
ing, retail, wholesale, and service sectors. We constructed a comprehensive and
detailed firm and establishment-level database that allows us to properly identify
both U.S.-owned MNCs and affiliates of foreign MNCs in the U.S.. Moreover, our
dataset also consists of non-MNCs thereby providing us with a suitable control
group for this study. Using our newly constructed dataset, we compared the con-
tribution of MNCs to U.S. employment growth in contrast to non-MNCs.
We find that MNCs recorded higher total employment growth rates relative to
the comparison group of non-MNCs. In particular, we find that MNCs create more
and destroy fewer jobs than non-MNCs. Moreover, MNCs are found to have created
119
relatively more jobs across all sectors; notably in the services sector. This result
suggests that within-firm reallocation across sectors may be increasingly important
in the study of business dynamism.
We do find that U.S.-owned MNCs that also engaged in importing activities ex-
hibit lower employment growth rates. This negative marginal effect is observed
across all major sectors. In subsequent work, we intend to directly estimate the
effect of changes in imports at the firm level on employment growth and realloca-
tion measures using an instrumental variables strategy to address the endogeneity
problem.
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Table 3.1: U.S. Census-Orbis and BEA Comparison (Employment Count, ’000)
US Census−Orbis BEA
US MNCs Foreign MNCs US MNCs Foreign MNCs
Year = 2012
Manufacturing 3,544 1,702 6,873 2,200
Wholesale 1,239 628 1,102 561
Retail 5,447 629 4,286 527
Services 11,916 2,875 10,595 2,555
Total 22,146 5,834 22,855 5,843
Year = 2007
Manufacturing 4,337 1,963 7,217 2,051
Wholesale 1,370 658 1,065 662
Retail 5,534 603 4,001 530
Services 12,328 3,078 10,151 2,307
Total 23,569 6,302 22,433 5,550
a Sectors are defined at the establishment level.
b In the BEA data, activity of U.S. MNCs corresponds to the activity of all US parents, and
it is classified under the industry of the parent.
c In the BEA data, activity of foreign affiliates in the U.S. corresponds to majority-owned
bank and nonbank U.S. affiliates, and it is classified under the industry of the affiliate.
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Table 3.2: Establishments Count and Growth Rates
Non MNC Non-MNC US MNC Foreign MNC MNC
Exporter & Exporter Importer Non trader TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
Importer Only Only
Panel A: Establishment Count (’000)
Year = 2012
Manufacturing 44 27 20 155 246 17 11 28
Wholesale 74 28 49 169 320 31 21 52
Retail 96 23 75 587 781 158 37 195
Services 135 73 124 3,492 3,824 276 57 333
NEC 3.2 0.5 1.4 4.9 10 8.2 2.6 11
TOTAL 352 152 269 4,408 5,181 490 129 619
Year = 2007
Manufacturing 44 27 23 181 275 19 12 31
Wholesale 71 27 55 189 342 30 22 52
Retail 86 27 86 626 825 155 36 191
Services 138 68 110 3467 3,783 276 64 340
NEC 3.3 0.5 1.5 6.2 11.5 7.3 2.7 10
TOTAL 342 150 276 4,469 5,237 487 137 624
Panel B: Average Annual Growth Rates (2008-2012)
Manufacturing 0.2% -0.4% -3.2% -3.1% -2.6% -1.5%
Wholesale 0.9% 0.7% -2.5% -2.2% 0.3% -0.8%
Retail 2.1% -3.2% -2.7% -1.3% 0.3% 0.4%
Services -0.5% 1.5% 2.4% 0.1% 0.0% -2.3%
NEC -0.9% 0.5% -2.1% -4.2% 2.2% -0.4%
Panel C: Growth Rates between 2007-2012
Manufacturing 1.2% -2.0% -15.9% -15.5% -11.1% -12.7% -7.3% -10.2%
Wholesale 4.7% 3.7% -12.5% -11.1% -6.6% 1.4% -4.0% 0.0%
Retail 10.6% -16.0% -13.5% -6.5% -5.5% 1.4% 1.8% 2.1%
Services -2.6% 7.4% 11.8% 0.7% 1.1% 0.1% -11.3% -2.1%
NEC -4.6% 2.5% -10.5% -21.9% -14.0% 11.2% -2.0% 7.7%
a Sectors are defined at the establishment level.
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Table 3.3: Employment Count and Growth Rates
Non MNC Non-MNC US MNC Foreign MNC MNC
Exporter & Exporter Importer Non trader TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
Importer Only Only
Panel A: Establishment Count (’000)
Year = 2012
Manufacturing 3,141 653 567 1,459 5,820 3,544 1,702 5,246
Wholesale 1,570 286 657 1,161 3,674 1,239 628 1,867
Retail 2,522 412 1,230 4,449 8,613 5,447 629 6,076
Services 7,384 1,818 7,255 41,448 57,905 11367 2760 14127
NEC 164 12 45 34 255 549 115 664
TOTAL 14,781 3,181 9,754 48,551 76,267 22,146 5,834 27,980
Year = 2007
Manufacturing 3,382 745 782 1,926 6,835 4,337 1,963 6,300
Wholesale 1,529 293 798 1,376 3,996 1,370 658 2,028
Retail 2,232 476 1,602 4,973 9,283 5,534 603 6,137
Services 7,019 1,622 6,820 40,921 56,382 11,778 2,954 14,732
NEC 161 14 60 43 278 550 124 674
TOTAL 14,323 3,150 10,062 49,239 76,774 23,569 6,302 29,871
Panel B: Average Annual Growth Rates (2008-2012)
Manufacturing 0.2% -0.4% -3.2% -3.1% -2.6% -1.5%
Wholesale 0.9% 0.7% -2.5% -2.2% 0.3% -0.8%
Retail 2.1% -3.2% -2.7% -1.3% 0.3% 0.4%
Services -0.5% 1.5% 2.4% 0.1% 0.0% -2.3%
NEC -0.9% 0.5% -2.1% -4.2% 2.2% -0.4%
Panel C: Growth Rates between 2007-2012
Manufacturing -7.4% -13.1% -31.9% -27.6% -16.0% -20.1% -14.3% -18.3%
Wholesale 2.6% -2.3% -19.3% -16.9% -8.4% -10.0% -4.7% -8.3%
Retail 12.2% -14.2% -26.3% -11.1% -7.5% -1.6% 4.2% -1.0%
Services 5.1% 11.4% 6.2% 1.3% 2.7% -3.6% -6.8% -4.2%
NEC 1.9% -15.4% -28.0% -23.4% -8.6% 0.0% -7.7% -1.5%
a Sectors are defined at the establishment level.
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Table 3.4: Firm Count and Growth Rates
Non MNC US MNC Foreign MNC
Exporter & Importer Exporter only Importer only Non trader TOTAL TOTAL
Panel A: Firm Count (’000)
Year = 2012
Manufacturing 33 25 18 152 2.2 2.9
Wholesale 44 25 39 158 1 3.7
Retail 9 15 34 519 0.5 0.4
Services 13 29 41 3092 4.1 3
Year = 2007
Manufacturing 33 26 21 178 2.9 3.2
Wholesale 42 24 45 177 1.5 4.3
Retail 8 15 40 562 0.7 0.4
Services 11 29 43 3103 5.9 3.9
Panel B: Average Annual Growth Rates (2008-2012)
Manufacturing 0.4% -0.3% -3.0% -3.2% -5.7% -2.0%
Wholesale 0.6% 1.0% -2.7% -2.3% -9.4% -2.7%
Retail 1.8% -0.1% -3.3% -1.6% -7.1% -3.5%
Services 1.9% 0.0% -0.8% -0.1% -7.2% -5.0%
Panel C: Growth Rates between 2007-2012
Manufacturing 1.9% -1.4% -14.8% -15.8% -28.4% -10.1%
Wholesale 3.2% 5.2% -13.7% -11.6% -46.3% -13.5%
Retail 9.0% -0.4% -16.4% -8.0% -35.0% -17.5%
Services 9.5% 0.0% -3.8% -0.3% -35.6% -25.1%
a Sectors are defined as the employment weighted NAICS 2 at the firm-level. For multi-unit firms, total employment are aggregated
up to the NAICS2 level, and the firm-level sector is defined as NAICS code associated with the highest level of employment.
Table 3.5: Sectors of the Establishments of MNC and non-MNC
2007 2012
US MNC Foreign MNC Non-MNC US MNC Foreign MNC Non-MNC
Single sector firms (’000)
Manufacturing 1.5 2.2 252 1 1.9 224
Wholesale 1.2 3.9 285 0.6 3.4 262
Retail 0.5 0.3 619 0.3 0.2 571
Services 5.4 3.6 3181 3.7 2.7 3170
Multiple sectors firms (’000) 2.5 1.8 21 2.2 1.7 19
% of firms in multiple sectors relative to total firm 22.7% 15.3% 0.5% 28.3% 17.2% 0.5%
a Sectors are defined at the establishment level.
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Table 3.6: Number of Source Countries (Median Firm)
Panel A: Imports
Year = 2007 Year = 2012
All Imports Related Party Non-Related Party All Imports Related Party Non-Related Party
US MNC 5 1 4 6 1 6
Foreign MNC 3 1 3 4 2 3
importers only (non MNC) 1 0 1 1 0 1
Importers and Exporters (non MNC) 2 0 2 2 0 2
Panel B: Exports
Year = 2007 Year = 2012
All Exports Related Party Non-Related Party All Exports Related Party Non-Related Party
US MNC 7 1 7 10 1 9
Foreign MNC 3.5 1 3 4 1 4
Exporters only (non MNC) 1 0 1 1 0 1
Importers and Exporters (non MNC) 2 0 2 2 0 2
Table 3.7: Number of Products (Median Firm)
Panel A: Imports
Year = 2007 Year = 2012
All Imports Related Party Non-Related Party All Imports Related Party Non-Related Party
US MNC 12 6 11 16 7 15
Foreign MNC 13 9 9 15 10 10
importers only (non MNC) 2 1 2 2 1 2
Importers and Exporters (non MNC) 4 2 4 4 2 4
Panel B: Exports
Year = 2007 Year = 2012
All Exports Related Party Non-Related Party All Exports Related Party Non-Related Party
US MNC 11 5 10 15 8 14
Foreign MNC 7 3 7 8 3 7
Exporters only (non MNC) 1 1 1 1 1 1
Importers and Exporters (non MNC) 3 1 3 3 1 3
a Products are defined at the HS10 level.
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Table 3.8: Aggregate Related Party Trade
Ratio of Related Party Imports/Total Imports
2007 2012
US MNC 45.7% 41.2%
Foreign MNC 72.2% 69.1%
importers only (non MNC) 9.5% 10.3%
Importers and Exporters (non MNC) 21.1% 21.1%
Ratio of Related Party Exports/Total Exports
2007 2012
US MNC 37.7% 35.9%
Foreign MNC 44.5% 43.8%
Exporters only (non MNC) 7.8% 12.9%
Importers and Exporters (non MNC) 11.2% 11.5%
Table 3.9: Annual Employment Growth Rates at the Firm Level
Annual Employment Growth Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MNC -0.00177 0.0514***
[0.00587] [0.00519]
US MNC -0.00111 0.0516***
[0.00592] [0.00559]
Foreign MNC -0.00426 0.0509***
[0.00805] [0.00617]
Observations 48000000 48000000 48000000 48000000
R-squared 0.002 0.257 0.002 0.257
Fixed Effects Year Cells Year Cells
Clustered SE Year Cells Year Cells
a In Columns (1) and (3), the regressions were estimated with year fixed effects.
In Columns (2) and (4), the regressions were estimated using the fully saturated
model, whereby the cells are constructed by interacting Age × Industry × Size
× Multi-Unit × Year.
b Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3.10: Firm Decomposition of Job Creation Rate (Weighted)
Total Job Creation Births Acquisitions Continuers
Panel A: MNC Indicator
MNC 0.0420*** 0.0180*** 0.0178*** 0.00620***
[0.00339] [0.00173] [0.00246] [0.00172]
Panel B: US and Foreign MNC Indicators
US MNC 0.0403*** 0.0180*** 0.0170*** 0.00531***
[0.00378] [0.00189] [0.00272] [0.00195]
Foreign MNC 0.0475*** 0.0181*** 0.0202*** 0.00919***
[0.00418] [0.00209] [0.00245] [0.00296]
Observations 48,000,000 48,000,000 48,000,000 48,000,000
a Fixed effects are constructed by interacting Age × Industry × Size × Multi-Unit × Year.
b Clustered standard errors at Age × Industry × Size × Multi-Unit × Year level.
Table 3.11: Firm Decomposition of Job Destruction Rate (Weighted)
Total Job Destruction Deaths Divestitures Continuers
Panel A: MNC Indicator
MNC -0.00945** 0.00319 -0.00832*** -0.00432**
[0.00450] [0.00203] [0.00306] [0.00182]
Panel B: US and Foreign MNC Indicators
US MNC -0.0113** 0.0027 -0.00940*** -0.00459**
[0.00491] [0.00227] [0.00325] [0.00200]
Foreign MNC -0.00336 0.00480** -0.00473 -0.00343
[0.00483] [0.00230] [0.00366] [0.00225]
Observations 48,000,000 48,000,000 48,000,000 48,000,000
a Fixed effects are constructed by interacting Age × Industry × Size × Multi-Unit × Year.
b Clustered standard errors at Age × Industry × Size × Multi-Unit × Year level.
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Table 3.12: Firm Decomposition of Churning Rate and Excess Reallocation Rate
(Weighted)
Churning Excess Reallocation
Panel A: MNC Indicator
MNC 0.0325*** 0.0241***
[0.00606] [0.00389]
Panel B: US and Foreign MNC Indicators
US MNC 0.0290*** 0.0220***
[0.00674] [0.00437]
Foreign MNC 0.0442*** 0.0309***
[0.00660] [0.00488]
Observations 48000000 48000000
a Fixed effects are constructed by interacting Age × Industry × Size ×
Multi-Unit × Year.
b Clustered standard errors at Age × Industry × Size × Multi-Unit ×
Year level.
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Table 3.13: Sectoral Decomposition of Net Job Creation Rate (Weighted)
Sectors Net Job Creation Share of Net Job Creation Job Creation Job Destruction
JCit − JDit JCit JDit
MNC Indicator
Manufacturing 0.0104*** 0.21 0.00819*** -0.00222***
[0.000440] [0.000330] [0.000300]
Wholesale 0.00308*** 0.06 0.00422*** 0.00115***
[0.000440] [0.000330] [0.000300]
Retail 0.00687*** 0.14 0.0023 -0.00456**
[0.00249] [0.00171] [0.00222]
Services 0.0303*** 0.60 0.0265*** -0.00383
[0.00433] [0.00277] [0.00364]
a Each row represents separate regressions that are estimated at the sectoral level. The dependent variables are net
job creation (JCit − JDit), gross job creation (JCit) and gross job destruction (JDit).
Dep Vari,t = β0 + β1MNCi,t + νi,t + εi,t
b Fixed effects are constructed by interacting Age × Industry × Size × Multi-Unit × Year.
c Clustered standard errors at Age × Industry × Size × Multi-Unit × Year level.
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Table 3.14: Sectoral Decomposition of Net Job Creation Rate (Weighted)
Sectors Net Job Creation Share of Net Job Creation Job Creation Job Destruction
JCit − JDit JCit JDit
Panel A: US MNC
Manufacturing 0.00918*** 0.18 0.00712*** -0.00206**
[0.00110] [0.000559] [0.000868]
Wholesale 0.00270*** 0.05 0.00365*** 0.000957***
[0.000440] [0.000366] [0.000307]
Retail 0.00721*** 0.14 0.00244 -0.00476*
[0.00272] [0.00190] [0.00249]
Services 0.0317*** 0.62 0.0262*** -0.00549
[0.00465] [0.00311] [0.00390]
Panel B: Foreign MNC
Manufacturing 0.0145*** 0.29 0.0117*** -0.00274*
[0.00201] [0.00111] [0.00161]
Wholesale 0.00434*** 0.09 0.00611*** 0.00177**
[0.000908] [0.000693] [0.000786]
Retail 0.00574*** 0.11 0.00183 -0.00391**
[0.00220] [0.00146] [0.00169]
Services 0.0257*** 0.51 0.0274*** 0.0017
[0.00496] [0.00351] [0.00392]
a Each row represents separate regressions that are estimated at the sectoral level. The dependent variables are net
job creation (JCit − JDit), gross job creation (JCit) and gross job destruction (JDit).
Dep Vari,t = β0 + β1US MNCi,t + β2Foreign MNCi,t + νi,t + εi,t
b Fixed effects are constructed by interacting Age × Industry × Size × Multi-Unit × Year.
c Clustered standard errors at Age × Industry × Size × Multi-Unit × Year level.
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Table 3.15: Annual Employment Growth, MNC and Related Party Trade Indicators
(Weighted)
Annual Employment Growth
All Sectors Manufacturing Wholesale Trade Retail Trade Services NEC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Main Effects
US MNC 0.0457*** 0.00440* 0.00531*** 0.000426 0.0362*** -0.000603
[0.0149] [0.00226] [0.00108] [0.00742] [0.0115] [0.000471]
Foreign MNC 0.00453 -0.0267*** -0.00479 0.00841 0.029 -0.00139*
[0.0257] [0.00901] [0.00315] [0.00526] [0.0222] [0.000775]
Importer (RP) 0.0298*** 0.00768*** 0.00493*** 0.00715** 0.00928* 0.000784**
[0.00626] [0.00124] [0.000611] [0.00326] [0.00494] [0.000354]
Importer (Non-RP) 0.118*** 0.0309*** 0.0129*** 0.0144*** 0.0592*** 0.000907***
[0.00360] [0.00111] [0.000549] [0.00141] [0.00278] [0.000162]
Exporter (RP) 0.0226*** 0.0141*** 0.00226*** -0.00387 0.00992 0.000155
[0.00746] [0.00133] [0.000564] [0.00370] [0.00625] [0.000384]
Exporter (Non-RP) 0.0885*** 0.0286*** 0.0119*** 0.0110*** 0.0365*** 0.000488***
[0.00369] [0.00109] [0.000554] [0.00133] [0.00285] [0.000151]
Related Party Trade MNC Differential
US MNC × Importer (RP) 0.0146 0.00371** -0.00307** 0.00832 0.00442 0.00125
[0.0130] [0.00181] [0.00142] [0.00799] [0.00916] [0.000853]
US MNC × Exporter (RP) 0.0107 -0.00244 0.00301 0.0112* -0.00188 0.000859
[0.0119] [0.00186] [0.00218] [0.00577] [0.00919] [0.000622]
Foreign MNC × Importer (RP) -0.00346 -0.000716 -0.00637* -0.00714 0.00975 0.00102
[0.0251] [0.00426] [0.00333] [0.00474] [0.0226] [0.00105]
Foreign MNC × Exporter (RP) 0.016 0.00513 0.00684* 0.0157** -0.0126 0.000997
[0.0186] [0.00402] [0.00374] [0.00694] [0.0152] [0.000930]
Non-Related Party Trade MNC Differential
US MNC × Importer (Non-RP) -0.0676*** -0.00805*** -0.00415*** -0.0147** -0.0403*** -0.000344
[0.0146] [0.00210] [0.00142] [0.00676] [0.0116] [0.000673]
US MNC × Exporter (Non-RP) 0.00325 -0.00345 -0.00541*** 0.00354 0.00837 0.000206
[0.0149] [0.00224] [0.00142] [0.00707] [0.0115] [0.000593]
Foreign MNC × Importer (Non-RP) -0.00849 0.011 -0.0013 -0.00983** -0.00909 0.000745
[0.0201] [0.00718] [0.00272] [0.00467] [0.0166] [0.00127]
Foreign MNC × Exporter (Non-RP) -0.00327 0.0155** 0.00403 -0.00394 -0.0187 -0.000154
[0.0345] [0.00707] [0.00491] [0.00559] [0.0316] [0.00116]
Observations 48000000 48000000 48000000 48000000 48000000 48000000
a Fixed effects are constructed by interacting Age × Industry × Size × Multi-Unit × Year.
b Clustered standard errors at Age × Industry × Size × Multi-Unit × Year level.
c The variables US MNC, Foreign MNC, Importer (RP), Importer (Non-RP), Exporter (RP) and Exporter (Non-RP) are binary indicators.
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Table 3.16: Annual Employment Growth, MNC and Log of Related Party Trade
(Weighted)
Annual Employment Growth
All Sectors Manufacturing Wholesale Trade Retail Trade Services NEC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Main Effects
US MNC 0.0581*** 0.00582** 0.00686*** 0.000946 0.0452*** -0.000685
[0.0135] [0.00231] [0.00110] [0.00638] [0.0106] [0.000535]
Foreign MNC 0.0349 -0.0138* 0.00117 0.00880* 0.0401** -0.00145**
[0.0232] [0.00725] [0.00258] [0.00451] [0.0204] [0.000740]
Log Imports (RP) -0.000156 -0.000264** 5.15E-005 0.000351 -0.000345 5.03E-005
[0.000522] [0.000104] [5.41e-05] [0.000248] [0.000448] [3.22e-05]
Log imports (Non-RP) 0.00995*** 0.00266*** 0.00123*** 0.00142*** 0.00455*** 9.59e-05***
[0.000345] [0.000105] [5.15e-05] [0.000183] [0.000235] [1.57e-05]
Log Exports (RP) -0.000973 0.000198 -0.000233*** -0.000730* -0.000198 -9.24E-006
[0.000732] [0.000121] [5.12e-05] [0.000419] [0.000539] [3.54e-05]
Log Exports (Non-RP) 0.00762*** 0.00277*** 0.00103*** 0.000824*** 0.00296*** 3.93e-05**
[0.000332] [0.000109] [4.90e-05] [0.000123] [0.000247] [1.96e-05]
Related Party Trade MNC Differential
US MNC X Log Imports (RP) 0.000568 0.000350** -8.77E-005 -0.000174 0.000451 2.77E-005
[0.00115] [0.000174] [0.000113] [0.000704] [0.000782] [7.23e-05]
US MNC X Log Exports (RP) 0.00126 -0.000104 0.000423** 0.00067 0.000207 6.57E-005
[0.000988] [0.000155] [0.000167] [0.000488] [0.000757] [5.36e-05]
Foreign MNC X Log Imports (RP) -0.000726 -8.29E-005 4.56E-005 -0.000656* -6.62E-005 3.29E-005
[0.00165] [0.000374] [0.000194] [0.000381] [0.00147] [8.17e-05]
Foreign MNC X Log Exports (RP) 0.00219 -0.000237 0.000364 0.00136** 0.000607 9.18E-005
[0.00134] [0.000436] [0.000308] [0.000635] [0.000934] [7.69e-05]
Non-Related Party Trade MNC Differential
US MNC X Log Imports (Non-RP) -0.00420*** -0.000931*** -0.000436*** 0.000199 -0.00305*** 1.27E-005
[0.00126] [0.000157] [9.79e-05] [0.000816] [0.000775] [5.62e-05]
US MNC X Log Exports (Non-RP) -0.00137 -0.000209 -0.000602*** -0.000441 -0.000131 1.38E-005
[0.00111] [0.000241] [0.000138] [0.000473] [0.000873] [6.47e-05]
Foreign MNC X Log Imports (Non-RP) -0.00196 0.000183 -0.000656** -0.000582 -0.000954 4.65E-005
[0.00141] [0.000489] [0.000280] [0.000419] [0.00115] [9.55e-05]
Foreign MNC X Log Exports (Non-RP) -0.00209 0.00078 9.82E-006 -0.000512 -0.00235 -1.29E-005
[0.00230] [0.000574] [0.000376] [0.000451] [0.00206] [9.20e-05]
Observations 48000000 48000000 48000000 48000000 48000000 48000000
a Fixed effects are constructed by interacting Age × Industry × Size × Multi-Unit × Year.
b Clustered standard errors at Age × Industry × Size × Multi-Unit × Year level.






A.1 Dates of GSP Implementations and Renewals
Table A.1: GSP Implementations and Renewals
Effective Date Date Expired Period of Expiration (months)
October 30, 1984 July 4, 1993
August 10, 1993 September 30, 1994 1
December 8, 1994 July 31, 1995 2
October 1, 1996 May 31, 1997 14
August 5, 1997 June 30, 1998 2
October 21, 1998 June 30, 1999 3.5
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where the first order conditions are:

































































To obtain an expression for the marginal cost of the firm, I first define these two
terms:
Ũjk ≡ Ujk(1 + τjk)




Next, to derive the expression for the marginal cost, the optimal input choices are








































)1−φexp ∫ 10 γj log(Vjγj )dj
φ























∂ log(1 + τjk)
=− φ ∂ logBi










































d log pi = d logM〉 + d logMCi + d log(1 + τjk) (A.8)
Taking the natural logarithm of the components on the right-hand side of equa-




(d log pi − d logPk) = −Γi(d log pi − d logPk)
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d log pik =
1
1 + Γik













































































Defining the following expression as:





d log(1 + τjk)







∂ log(1 + τjk)
=− ρ ∂ log pik
∂ log(1 + τjk)
+ (ρ− ν) ∂ logPk
∂ log(1 + τjk)
=− ρ ∂ log pik
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must be less than zero. That is,
σik > 1 + Γik .
The elasticity of demand for firm i must be relatively higher than the firm’s markup





This section shows the proof that
dΛ∗0
d(1 + τjk)



















































































































































































































































d(1 + τjk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
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εX,τ > εXj ,τ
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where εX,τ and εXj ,τ are, respectively, the elasticity of the intermediate input bun-
dle X, and individual variety of intermediate input, Xj, with respect to tariff. Since
the elasticities are negative, this relationship implies that Xj must be relatively
more elastic (i.e. more negative). Intuitively, this condition is reasonable and fol-
lows similar logic to that of the household’s nested demand function. Consider a
manufacturing firm that produces clothing: its demand for textiles would be more
inelastic relative to its demand for silk materials.
A.3 Measurement and Estimation Details
A.3.1 Estimation of ∆bit
I adopted the methodology employed in Trefler (2004) to construct ∆bit using
two steps. First, the following regression is estimated using OLS for each industry
separately.








where zit ≡ (log gdpt, log rert), with rert defined as the real exchange rate and gspt
the gross domestic product at time t. Second, with the predicted values of ∆yit,




t/3; that is, the industry-specific prediction of
the effect of business conditions on employment growth during the period associ-




t/3 as the industry
specific prediction of the effect of business conditions on employment growth dur-
ing the period before the GSP shock.
A.3.2 Decomposition of Net Job Creation: Methodology
As is now standard in the study of business dynamics, the following definitions
are used in the decomposition of net job creation into the different margins as
discussed in the main text. First, at the establishment level, job creation (JC) and
job destruction (JD) are defined as:
JCet = max(get, 0)
JDet = max(−get, 0)
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For establishments that newly enter in period t, the job creation rate would be +2,
while for establishments that exit in period t, the job destruction rate would be −2.
To aggregate up to the firm level, we obtain the following expressions for the













Equations (A.9) and (A.10) can separately be defined for different types of estab-

























max(get, 0)1(get = 2) (A.14)












max(−get, 0)1(get = −2) (A.16)
The main difference in distinguishing between job creation through births vis-à-
vis through acquisitions is that the establishment identifiers (LBDNUM) associated
with births would be new identifiers in the LBD. On the other hand, the LBDNUMs
associated with acquisitions would have existed in the previous period, albeit being
attributed to a different firm identifier (FIRMID). The same concept is applied in
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distinguishing between job destruction associated with deaths vis-à-vis divestitures.
Establishment identifiers (LBDNUM) that belonged to the same firm i in period t−1
but no longer exist in the LBD in period t are deemed to be deaths. Meanwhile,
LBDNUMs that switched firms, for example from firm x to firm y from period t− 1




B.1 Data Descriptions and Variable Constructions
We adapted the methodology described in the NBER-CES Manufacturing Indus-
try Database: Technical Notes (2013) and Kehrig (2015) in the construction of the
variables used in this paper. The main establishment-level model objects that are
required to calculate misallocation are physical productivity and the relative distor-
tions on capital and labor. These model objects are calculated from the following
data variables: value added, physical output, capital stock, and labor hours.
The ASM/CMF databases provide the establishment level measure of value
added, V Aie. We mapped the model object, PieYie, to the variable V Aie in the data.
We do not observe the physical output, Yie, for all establishments in the ASM/CMF
database and so, we inferred Yie from the measure of value added. Given that
the establishments are monopolistically competitive and face downward sloping
demand curves, establishments with high physical output must have a lower price.
We follow Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and raise V Aie to the power of σ/(σ − 1) to
arrive at the measure of physical output.
The capital stock measure, Kie is available in the ASM/CMF database and is
derived based on the perpetual inventory equation (see Foster et al. (2008)):
Kie,t = (1− δi,t−1)Kie,t−1 + Iie,t ,
where Iie,t denotes investment at time t, and δi,t denotes the depreciation rate at
the industry level i at time t.
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The labor hours variable, Lie, measures the number of hours worked by all
employees in an establishment. This would include the hours of both production
workers (PH) and non-production workers (NPH) (i.e. managers, supervisors).
While the ASM/CMF provide measures of the hours of production workers, they
do not, however, provide information about the hours of non-production workers.
We backed out NPH from the information on wages of workers. In the ASM/CMF,
the wages of all workers (SW ) and of production workers (WW ) are available.
Therefore, the wage per production worker is given as WW/PH. Following Kehrig
(2015), we assume that the wages for non-production workers are 150% of those
for production workers. So, the estimated wage per non-production worker is
given as 1.5 × (WW/PH). Thus, our estimate for NPH is (SW − WW )/(1.5 ×
(WW/PH)). We obtain the measure for labor hours as follows:




The reported values of wages in the ASM/CMF do not include workers’ benefits.
The Bureau Labor of Statistics (BLS) provided us with previously unpublished man-
ufacturing industry sector cost estimates for wages and salaries and total benefits
from the National Compensation Survey (NCS). Specifically, we obtained detailed
data for the manufacturing industry sector (private industry sector) as defined by
SIC and NAICS for the period spanning from 1987 through 2007. The NCS is a rel-
atively small establishment survey that has varied in size over the years. In many
SIC and NAICS codes, the sample size is too small to provide detailed industry
estimates at either a 4-digit SIC (for earlier years) or 6-digit NAICS. Therefore,
the estimates are calculated at higher levels of aggregation (2-digit SIC and 3-digit
NAICS) and by pooling together five years of data. Since several years of data are
pooled together to provide a proxy for a given year, we used the data in constant
dollar values.
Before matching this dataset to our ASM/CMF data, we concord the BLS’ wages
and salaries (Wages) and total benefits (Benefits) dataset that are in SIC industry
codes to the NAICS 2007 industry codes level, by employing the NAICS-to-SIC
concordance from the BLS (www.bls.gov/ces/naicstosic2.htm). Using this stan-
dardized dataset, we calculate the total wages and benefits adjustment factor as
(Wages + Benefits)/Wages for each industry code. We then multiplied the wages of
all workers (SW ) in the ASM/CMF dataset with this adjustment factor.
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B.2 Proofs













The expression for the actual relative revenue productivity term is the weighted





, the relative marginal











. We show that each of these three terms could be rewritten using
the relative distortions on factor inputs.
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Putting the terms together, we can write the actual ratio of revenue productivity as






















C.1.1 Identifying Corporate Groups
C.1.1.1 Identifying MNCs using the Immediate Shareholder (ISH) variable
Recent papers have provided several reasons why the Immediate Shareholder
(ISH) is a better indicator than the Global Ultimate Owner (GUO) in ascertaining
if a firm is domestically-owned or foreign-owned. Notwithstanding the merits of
the ISH, we wish to point out two instances when using the ISH alone can lead
to misleading conclusions about the country of origin of the parent company. The
first instance occurs when the firm and its ISH are located in the same country.
In this case, the firm will look like a domestically-owned entity, even if it were to
be an affiliate of a foreign multinational. The second instance is one in which the
firm, its ISH and its GUO are located in three different countries. If we were to
assume that the country where the ISH is located is the country of origin for the
corporation, we will misidentify the firm’s country of origin.
Consider the case of Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. From Orbis, the ISH of Sam-
sung Semiconductor Europe Limited is located in the United Kingdom. Hence,
this procedure will determine that the firm is European while, in fact, the firm is
Korean-owned. In another instance, a Samsung affiliate in Ukraine is immediately
owned by Samsung Electronics Benelux, a holding company located in the Nether-
lands. In this case, the Ukraine subsidiary will be mistakenly classified as part of a
Dutch-owned corporation.
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Table C.1: Using the Immediate Shareholder (ISH) variable to identify MNCs (at
the firm level)
Country Number of Correctly classified Misclassified as Correctly classified as
Foreign as foreign-owned domestically-owned foreign-owned but wrong
Affiliates country of origin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AT 3,957 2,226 985 746
AU 1,489 650 669 170
BE 5,930 3,311 1,559 1,060
BG 959 555 189 215
CZ 5,163 3,488 596 1,079
DE 16,511 8,027 6,110 2,374
DK 2,023 1,197 475 351
ES 9,511 4,735 3,138 1,638
FI 2,386 1,555 442 389
FR 14,307 6,463 6,256 1,588
GB 22,162 7,834 11,602 2,726
GR 1,014 600 173 241
HU 1,713 1,377 53 283
IE 2,046 989 537 520
IT 8,918 4,298 2,796 1,824
JP 462 353 66 43
LT 728 508 72 148
LV 1,061 780 87 194
NL 5,836 2,231 2,840 765
NO 3,134 1,762 894 478
NZ 566 356 66 144
PL 7,456 4,690 1,240 1,526
PT 3,806 2,062 867 877
RO 4,501 3,153 413 935
RU 3,797 1,815 1,263 719
SI 838 584 78 176
SK 2,894 2,117 157 620
US 2,297 1,380 772 145
Note:This table shows the number of firms the immediate shareholder classify as locals and foreign
owned. The first column of this table corresponds to the total number of firms in each country that
are foreign owned. The second column corresponds to the number of firms whose ISH and GUO
are located in the same origin country. The third column corresponds to the number of firms that
the ISH define as locals, even when they are foreign owned. And finally, the fourth column shows
the number of firms that are classified as a foreign owned companies, but from a different country
than the one corresponding to the parent company.
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Table C.1 shows the ability of the ISH to correctly classify the country of origin
of a given firm. The first column of this table corresponds to the number of firms
in each country that are foreign-owned. The second column corresponds to the
number of firms that are correctly classified; i.e. firms whose ISH and GUO are
located in the same country. The third column corresponds to the number of firms
that the ISH define as domestically-owned, while, in fact, they are foreign-owned.
Finally, the fourth column shows the number of firms that are classified as foreign-
owned, but are from a different country than the one corresponding to the parent
company. On average, almost half of the foreign affiliates in a given country are
misclassified either as domestically-owned or foreign-owned but attributed to the
wrong country of origin.
In Table C.2, we present the fractions of firms within a corporate group that are
correctly classified, misclassified as domestically-owned, or correctly classified as
foreign-owned but attributed to the wrong country of origin. Each column repre-
sents the number of countries in which the corporate group have operations. As
seen from the table, for most countries, less than half of the firms within the cor-
porate group are correctly classified as foreign (column 4–6). Nevertheless, for
large corporations (measured in terms of the number of countries of operations)
the fractions of firms in the corporate group that are correctly classified as foreign
is higher.
There are also large cross-country variations in the proportions of affiliates
within a corporation that are misclassified as domestic companies or correctly clas-
sified as foreign but from a different country of origin. The variation is more pro-
nounced for corporations with presence in more than five countries. In Germany,
an average of 10 percent of foreign affiliates in a corporate group are mistaken as
domestic firms, while this fraction is nearly double in the United Kingdom. Sim-
ilarly, in Austria, 7.2 percent of the affiliates within the corporation are assigned
to a wrong country of origin, while this share is 17.2 percent for Greece and 38.6
percent for Ireland.
C.1.1.2 Identifying MNCs using the Global Ultimate Owner (GUO) variable
In general, the GUO indicator could serve three purposes: 1) to indicate which
firm is the head of the corporation; 2) to serve as the umbrella for the group of
firms which belong to a given corporate group; and 3) to determine the country
of origin of the corporation. However, as described in the main text, the GUO that
Orbis identified may not meet the criteria of a genuine parent firm as typically
defined in economic models. First, many corporations have holding companies
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Table C.2: Using the Immediate Shareholder (ISH) variable to identify MNCs (at
the corporate-group level)
Country No of % Correctly % Misclassified % Correctly
corporate classified as domestically classified as
groups as foreign owned foreign-owned
but wrong country
of origin
No. of <= 3 3-5 > 5 <= 3 3-5 > 5 <= 3 3-5 > 5 <= 3 3-5 > 5
country
locations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
AT 756 89 111 40.7 53.9 52.2 2.3 5.7 10.1 0.7 4.0 7.2
AU 104 18 17 28.6 44.3 42.7 7.5 10.3 27.4 0.6 0.6 8.7
BE 566 78 80 32.4 37.8 40.8 5.1 11.1 19.3 1.0 4.6 10.4
BG 47 1 1 29.9 40.0 41.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CZ 352 11 6 34.1 35.5 32.8 0.6 6.0 1.2 0.1 15.5 8.7
DE 2087 281 413 35.2 45.8 50.7 2.7 4.8 10.4 1.3 4.0 7.4
DK 542 98 98 44.2 58.7 59.1 2.7 4.5 13.1 0.1 2.3 4.5
ES 940 92 75 30.1 34.3 36.9 1.9 3.8 11.1 0.3 1.7 4.3
FI 265 39 59 29.4 41.2 51.3 3.0 8.7 12.7 0.3 2.3 4.6
FR 938 163 218 25.2 31.2 36.8 2.5 7.2 13.0 0.8 4.1 5.8
GB 834 137 206 24.6 23.8 27.7 4.7 12.2 20.3 1.4 6.8 12.7
GR 53 9 9 33.2 39.1 26.9 1.8 2.8 12.9 3.4 2.7 17.2
HU 12 3 28.3 40.0 2.2 30.9 0.0 1.4
IE 144 6 10 39.8 40.7 22.6 8.2 11.0 31.5 1.1 13.3 38.6
IT 1429 199 178 32.2 43.4 46.4 1.9 3.8 7.0 1.0 3.3 5.9
JP 358 111 249 26.1 34.1 38.0 1.2 3.7 8.5 1.0 4.9 10.2
LT 51 8 1 38.2 38.6 71.4 1.4 6.4 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0
LV 46 1 1 40.4 60.0 50.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NL 1037 115 130 37.7 44.7 44.8 3.9 9.1 21.7 0.5 2.3 9.9
NO 481 58 46 31.7 37.0 38.2 4.3 8.4 17.0 0.6 4.2 10.9
NZ 6 5 23.8 43.8 17.7 26.8 11.1 12.7
PL 99 15 15 29.7 34.4 31.6 1.6 7.1 8.0 0.7 5.5 8.9
PT 253 13 12 27.7 25.8 30.1 3.5 7.9 14.2 0.5 2.1 13.4
RO 27 2 41.8 30.6 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
RU 63 5 9 18.6 11.4 3.7 2.2 6.3 2.8 1.5 15.5 9.5
SI 102 11 7 40.1 48.5 62.2 1.1 2.3 4.4 0.0 5.5 1.5
SK 95 2 4 36.5 33.0 26.5 3.8 0.0 7.9 1.0 0.0 6.3
US 300 85 339 27.4 28.1 33.5 15.1 26.5 27.7 7.7 18.5 28.0
Note: Each entry in this table corresponds to the fraction of firms within a corporation that are
foreign owned and that are correctly classified as foreign firms (columns 4–6), misclassified as do-
mestically owned firms (columns 7–9) or classified as foreign affiliates but from a different country
of origin (columns 10–12). For each of this categories the information is reported separately by the
number of countries in which the corporations holds operations: three or less countries (columns
1, 4, 7, and 10), more than three and less than five (columns 2, 5, 8, and 11), or more than five
countries (columns 3, 6, 9, and 12).
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that would be defined by Orbis as the GUO. These holding companies may also
be located in tax haven economies. If the GUO variable is taken literally, we will
observe many foreign affiliates in which their parent firms are located in tax haven
economies1. Some examples include:
1. EATON CORPORATION PLC is an example of a large U.S. company based in
Ireland (with operations in more than 40 countries and 160 affiliates).
2. EUROCHEM is located in Switzerland, but its GUO is in Bermuda (a small
company that does services activities for the headquarter).
3. CENTAUR LUXCO SARL is the head of the corporation and is a very small
company in terms of revenue with 77 subsidiaries worldwide. The address of
the GUO is in Luxembourg but, in fact, it is an entertainment operator based
in Madrid, Spain.
Second, Orbis considers financial ownership shares in determining a firm’s
GUO. As such, it is common for it to assign an international financial institution to
be the parent of an industrial company. These financial institutions typically hold
shares of the firm, but may not be involved in the strategic direction and manage-
ment of the firm. Failure to correct for such cases can lead one to an inaccurate
definition of corporate groups.
C.1.1.3 Defining the corporate groups
Given the above considerations, identifying the “true” parent company is chal-
lenging. The goal in this paper is more modest – we only need to accurately identify
the firms that belong to the same corporate group and the location of the group’s
country of origin. Once the boundaries of the corporate groups are defined, we
could determine the number of firms and the number of countries of operations
associated with each corporate group. Specifically for each corporate group, we
deduce these points from the location of the original GUO, total assets, number of
employees, and the number of firms per country2.
1These countries are: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, British Vir-
gin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Turks and Caicos, U.S. Virgin Islands. Belize, Costa
Rica, Panama, Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore, Andorra, Channel Islands (Guernsey and Jersey),
Cyprus, Gibraltar, Isle of Man, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, San Marino,
Switzerland, Bermuda and Liberia.
2We show that in nearly all cases, the country with the highest concentration of assets is the
country of origin of the corporate group.
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C.1.2 Matching Orbis to Census
C.1.2.1 Step 1: Standardization of names and addresses
First, we clean the Orbis dataset of names and addresses of business units by
correcting for common typos. For each observation, we used the SAS DQMATCH
function to separately parse the organization’s name and street address to create
several versions of match codes. Essentially, a match code yields a condensed ver-
sion of the character value, whereby the information content in each match code
is determined by the sensitivity level. For higher levels of sensitivities, the two
values must be very similar to produce the same match code. At lower levels of
sensitivities, the two values may produce the same match codes despite some dis-
similarities. In addition, we also employed the SOUNDEX function which encodes
each word phonetically. This is useful to detect names and addresses that sound
the same3. The same procedure is also employed for the corresponding variables
in the Business Register (BR) at the U.S. Census for the years 2004 to 2012. Both
the match codes and SOUNDEX codes are inputs for our matching procedure in the
next step.
C.1.2.2 Step 2: Sequential matching based on different criteria of tightness
The goal of this step is to match the business entities from Orbis (broadly speak-
ing, they would be considered as firms) with the list of establishments at the Busi-
ness Register (BR). It is important, therefore, to note that many-to-one and one-to-
many matches are very likely given that the definition of what constitutes a firm is
likely to differ between the two datasets.
The Orbis dataset for a given year is first matched to the BR for that correspond-
ing year. In addition, we have also used the BR for both the leading and lagging
years in the matching procedure. This is motivated by the possibility that some ob-
servations in the Orbis dataset in a given year could correspond to the names and
addresses of establishments in the BR either in the preceding or following year. For
example, the information in Orbis in a given year might be one year lagged as the
dataset might not have been updated.
Each establishment with a record in the BR contains both a physical address and
a mailing address. Each matching criterion is matched first to the physical address
in the BR. If unmatched, then we will follow up with another round of matching to
the mailing address. After every match round, the establishments in the BR that are
3We refer the reader to the various SAS documents that describe these steps in greater detail. A
good starting point is http://www2.sas.com/proceedings/forum2007/106-2007.pdf
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successfully matched to an observation from the Orbis dataset would be removed
from the list in the BR. Therefore, only establishments that are unmatched from the
previous rounds will be used in the subsequent round of matching. See Table C.3
for details of our matching algorithm.
Table C.3: Matching Algorithm
Versions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Organization Name
First line of Name (Soundex) ×
Second line of Name (Soundex) ×
First line of Name (Match code at 85% ) × × × ×
Second line of Name (Match code at 85%) × ×
Address
First line of Street Address (Soundex) × ×
First line of Street Address (Match code at 85%) × ×
Street Name (Match code at 85%) × ×
City name (Match code at 85%) ×
State name (Match code at 85%) ×
Zipcodes (Match code at 95%) × ×
Zipcodes (Match code at 80%) × × × × ×
Each version of our the matching algorithm would yield “cluster groups”. Firms
from Orbis and establishments in the BR that are in the same cluster group would
be deemed “matched”. Some matches are not unique since it is possible for several
establishments in the BR to share nearly identical organization names and street
addresses4.
C.1.2.3 Step 3: Dealing with multiple matches
The outcome from the matching procedure above would be either unique matches
(one Orbis firm matched to one BR establishment) or non-unique matches (one-
to-many, many-to-one or many-to-many). To further clean the matches, we first
4This is due to the fact that the source information for the BR is the tax EIN. A large firm could
potentially have several tax EINs.
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removed all workplace cafeterias and parking services that are located in a busi-
ness unit from the matches. In the BR, many workplace cafeterias and parking
services are identified by the name of the "host" organization. To avoid such spu-
rious matches, we removed the matches whereby the NAICS codes are given by
"722514" (cafeterias) and "812930" (parking services). If the match is unique, no
further cleaning is necessary. In all the other cases, the following cleaning proce-
dures were implemented:
1. One (Orbis) to many (BR) matches
Recall that we are interested in assigning ownership status of firms in the BR
based on the ownership status in Orbis. In the case of one-to-many matches,
we would assign the ownership information for the Orbis firm to all establish-
ments that are matched in the BR. In other words, the BR matched establish-
ments would inherit all the ownership information from the corresponding
Orbis firm.
2. Many (Orbis) to many (BR) matches
Within each cluster group, we would collapse the matches by FIRMIDs of the
BR establishments. If this procedure yields a unique FIRMID within the clus-
ter group, then this effectively becomes the case of the one-to-many matches
and would be treated as such. If this continues to yield multiple FIRMIDs,
then these matches are flagged for further manual checks.
3. Many (Orbis) to one (BR) matches
These firms are flagged for further manual checks.
C.1.2.4 Step 4: Merging Orbis-BR matches with ownership links
From the previous step, most (but not all) of the firms in the Orbis-BR dataset is
merged such that one FIRMID in the BR is matched to one firm in Orbis. For these
firms, the ownership information for the Orbis firm (i.e. identity of the corporate
group, country of origin, other members within the corporate group, etc.) would
be assigned accordingly. For FIRMIDs in the BR that are merged to multiple Orbis
firms, we exploit the corporate group identifier to pool these firms together. In
other words, despite these many-to-many matches, this issue is no longer a com-
plication as long as these BR firms do, in essence, belong to the same corporate
group. This is a very likely outcome because large corporate groups tend to be
matched to multiple FIRMIDs in the BR dataset. Any further remaining matches
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